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CHAPTER 
A great many widely differing actions are commonly described as 
manifesting intelligence or lack of it. To some, on the other hand, 
this description is generally considered inappropriate: we do not 
talk of intelligent sneezing or of unintelligent digestion of food. 
That there is no widely agreed convention to mark the borderline is 
unimportant for the immediate purposes of this discussion. It would 
be irrelevant to debate here what Piaget calls, in the same connection, 
"les questions de frontiéres" 1. We are concerned now only with thé 
recognition that when an action is described as intelligent this 
contrast is implied. 
It may, however, be implied only in a remote way, as something 
basic but overlaid. More prominent than the contrast between 
"intelligent" and "non- intelligent" may be that between "intelligent" 
and "unintelligent "; and since any action that can be called "un- 
intelligent" must be one that can be called "intelligent" in the first 
sense (that is, as contrasted with non -intelligent) there is here a 
certain risk of confusion. "Intelligent" in the first sense refers 
to the similarity which enables us to construct a rough scale of 
differences running from "intelligent" in the second sense to "unintelligent ". 
It is as if we lacked the word "weight" and had only the word "heavy" - or 
"heaviness" - to refer to the similarity which enables us to arrange 
1. Jean Piaget: La Psychologie de l'Intelligence, p. 16. (Paris; 
Armand Colin, 1947). In the section from which this quotation 
is taken Piaget gives an account of the opinions of a number 
of psychologists on the question of where the line should be 
drawn. 
2. 
objects in serial order according to possession of this property. 
Lack of the word "weight" might be no very serious disadvantage. 
But in the case of intelligence matters are greatly complicated by a 
further distinction which must be made. To make the further dis- 
tinction easier to discuss I propose to try to resolve the first 
ambiguity in "intelligent" by using the word "intelligential" - 
clumsy as it admittedly is - to take the place of "intelligent" in 
the first sense: that is, to oppose "non- intelligent" and refer to 
any action which is of the kind that may be intelligently or unintelli- 
gently performed. 
In the rest of this discussion we shall be talking, only of 
intelligential actions. We must now go on to consider what is being 
said when an intelligential action is described as "intelligent ".1 
We may - and commonly do - apply the name "intelligent actions" 
to (a) any specific actions for which we wish to make the positive claim 
that they have been performed in an intelligent manner; and (b) all 
actions which are of kinds that we judge to give us a sound basis for 
estimating the intelligence of the performer. (Both senses may of course 
be present together.) In other words, any given intelligential action 
may be said to be intelligent - or unintelligent, as the case may be - 
1. When we judge an action or a person "intelligent" the judgment of 
course presupposes some criterion of intelligence; but it would be 
.irrelevant at this point to discuss the choice of criteria since 
the distinction with which we are here concerned is one which does 
not depend on the nature of the criteria although their existence 
is presupposed by it. 
3. 
with respect both to the manner or "mode "1 of its performance, and 
to its "status" as an index of the intelligence of the person who 
performs it. 
At this point the reader may feel inclined to protest at once 
that any action which is performed intelligently must indicate that 
the person performing it is intelligent. But consider the following 
circumstance. In the Terman -Merrill Test, Form L, there occurs at 
year 10 the "word -naming" test. The child is told: "I want to see 
how many different words you can name in a minute." Now some children 
adopt a system in answering. They go round the room naming every 
object they see. Or they name all the animals they can think of, then 
all the birds and so on. These are methods likely to yield a con- 
siderable number of words quickly, and an answer guided by one of them 
may be judged more intelligent than one where no system at all is 
employed. Further, such a judgment can be made independently of know- 
ledge of the person who has given the answer. This, then, is to say that 
the action is intelligent in mode. But what of the "status" of the 
attempt to say as many words as possible in a minute? Is it an 
intelligent action, in the sense we have in mind when we say: "That's 
1. The evidence available for making judgments of mode will vary with 
the nature of the activity and the particular performance of it. 
The manner in which an action is performed may sometimes be 
largely covert, so that only the final result is available for 
scrutiny. Again, final results themselves vary in the extent 
to which they reveal the manner in which they were reached. 
These questions will be raised again in later chapters. 
- 
an intelligent sort of thing for an eight -year -old to be able to do "? 
I do not propose to attempt to answer this status question here. My 
point is that it is not the same question as the question about mode. 
To decide that an action is intelligent in mode is not to decide that 
it is intelligent in status - that it is an intelligent sort of thing 
for an X- year -old to be able to do. The first decision leaves the 
second one still to be made. 
The question of how the second one is to be made is one with 
which later parts of this thesis will be concerned. Meanwhile, I would 
emphasise that we do in fact very commonly make status decisions whereby 
we judge some intelligently performed actions to be more significant as 
indices of intelligence than others; that these decisions always have 
some regard to the age of the performer; and, most important of all, 
that we commonly take it for granted that our status decisions are of 
eneral validity. We say: "That's an intelligent thing for an 
X -year -old to be able to do" - not "for this X -year -old to be able to do." 
In fact, the attempt to assess intelligence must be a futile undertaking 
unless we are justified in assuming that at least some status decisions 
of quite general validity can be made. 
The idea that it may be possible to arrange people in serial 
order according to possession of some property called "intelligence" 
5. 
has a long history. Burt]. traces it back ultimately to Plato's analysis 
of the soul and from there follows it by way of Aristotle and the 
mediaeval schoolmen to the faculty psychologists, indicating at the 
same time the main contributions from biology and physiology to the 
subsequent growth of the idea. Be goes on to say, however, that all 
the earlier writers on the subject were interested primarily in "the 
working of the mind as such, that is to say, in problems of general 
psychology" and that it was not until the time of Galton that attempts 
were made to "apply scientific methods to the problems of individual 
psychology." This stressing of the contrast between "general" and 
"individual" has the rather unfortunate effect of seeming to suggest 
that it is possible to study the properties of "mind" without studying 
the properties of minds. It is true that for Galton interest in the 
differences between minds became primary, whereas previously interest 
in the similarities had tended to be dominant; but his work was a new 
departure not.so much because of a new awareness of differences in 
intelligence as of a determination actually to arrange people in order 
according to these differences, and so to begin mental measuring. It 
is true, however, that as a result of his work and that of his successors 
the notion of differences in intelligence has become almost as widely 
familiar as that of differences in temperature, whereas before his day 
only the most gross of the differences were commonly recognised,2 
1. Sir Cyril Burt: The evidence for the concept of intelligence: 
Brit. J. Educ. Psychol., 1955, 25, 158 - 177. 
2. See L.S. Penrose: The Biology of Mental Defect, Chap. I (London: 
Sidgwick and Jackon, 194.9) for a short historical account of 
attitudes to mental defect. 
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whatever may have been the perception of great thinkers on the subject. 
Galton's views about the nature of the differences are therefore. 
of some consequence, and it is particularly important that he placed as 
much emphasis as he did on their hereditary nature. In the preface 
to the second edition of "Hereditary Genius" he writes: 
"At the time when the book was written, the human mind was 
popularly thought... to be capable of almost any achievement, if 
compelled to exert itself by a will that had a power of initiation. 
Even those who had more philosophical habits of thought were far from 
looking on the mental faculties of each individual as being limited 
with as much strictness as those of his body, still less was the idea 
of the hereditary transmission of ability clearly apprehended. "1 
Galton does not here say how strict he considers the limitation 
of the "bodily faculties" to be, but the tenor of his subsequent 
argument implies that he must regard it as very strict indeed. He is 
careful however to explain his use of the term "ability ". It involves 
"qualities of intellect and disposition ": 
"I do not mean capacity without zeal, nor zeal without capacity, 
nor even a combination of both of them without an adequate power of 
doing a great deal of very laborious work. But I mean a nature which, 
when left to itself, will, urged by an inherent stimulus, climb the 
path that leads to eminence and has strength to reach the summit... "2 
1. F. Galton: Hereditary Genius: 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1892). 
2. Ibid. p. 33. 
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The former idea of the importance of "the will that had a power of 
initiation" is thus retained in Galton's own theory, but the will itself 
is regarded as hereditary, as a part of "natural ability ". On the 
other hand the distinction between intelligence and attainment is 
already clearly implied, for where there is capacity without zeal there 
will presumably be intelligence without corresponding attainment. 
When Binet began the construction of his famous intelligence test 
scale it was this distinction that he was primarily trying to make. 
His problem was to find some way of deciding which children should be 
sent to special schools, and whenever this is seen as a really perplexing 
problem the desirability of distinguishing between intelligence and 
attainment has been in some sense recognised. Without this 
recognition no need would have been felt for intelligence tests. 
Yet it is evident from Binet's writings that he found it very 
difficult to hold intelligence and attainment effectively apart. Thus 
at one point1 we find him claiming that when a school is well run and 
suitable tests of attainment are used there is no better means of 
telling whether a child is intelligent than by considering in relation 
to one another his age and his class in school, due allowance having 
been made for any irregularity of attendance. He goes on: 
"This amounts to judging intelligence by the amount of instruction. 
1. A. Binet and Th. Simon: Mentally Defective Children, p. 39. 
(Translated by 'W. B. Drummond. London: Edward Arnold, 1911+. 
8. 
Theoretically such a method is open to plenty of meticulous objections 
of which the most important is that we are confounding intelligence and 
memory. To this we shall reply that the stage of instruction reached 
is not the result of memory alone. It presupposes also some degree of 
application, some facility of comprehension, quite a collection of 
diverse aptitudes." 
But earlier in the same book he has s aid: 
"The end which we have constantly set before ourselves has been 
to bring to light the intellectual capacity of the child, taken by 
itself, as distinct from what the child actually knows. "1 
And again, later: 
"Although arithmetical ability depends upon special aptitude 
and a child may be quite intelligent though backward in arithmetic... "2 
These quotations show Binet acknowledging two important truths, 
but having some difficulty in reconciling them so as to form one 
principle to guide his work of test construction. Thus we find him 
maintaining that we can best judge a child's intelligence by considering 
the whole sum of his scholastic attainments because they presuppose 
"a collection of diverse aptitudes "; yet arguing, on the other hand, 
that some of these attainments are not such good indices of intelligence 
as others and that "intellectual capacity, taken by itself" can somehow 
be ascertained. 
1. Ibid: p. 28. 
2. Tbid: p. 58. 
9. 
So far as I have been able to discover,Binet never does bring 
together the two parts of this dual recognition: that a very great 
many human activities manifest intelligence in the sense that they 
may be performed more or less intelligently, and yet that certain 
sorts of activity are of central significance in the estimation of 
the intelligence of the person. The two notions are not incompatible: 
their reconciliation merely involves the distinction between "mode" 
and "status" that was made in the first section of this paper. But 
unless this distinction is explicitly made there is a very great risk 
that they will seem to be at war and that like Binet the test con- 
structor will be pulled to and fro between them. How can he make 
a case for the inclusion in his tests of some kinds of activity rather 
than others? If they all "manifest intelligence" the obvious course 
must be to sample them quite randomly. And yet he knows very well 
that some kinds of task have a stronger claim than others to be 
represented: that a child may be quite intelligent though backward in 
this or that. Galton saw this very clearly at the beginning for he 
speaks of sinking shafts at critical points and of the problem of how 
to ascertain the best points for the purpose. 
1 
The trouble is that 
this has since proved to be no easy problem to solve. 
Binet himself failed to solve it, in the sense that he provided 
no consistent theoretical justification for his choice of points. 
1. F. Galton: Remarks on an article by Cattell. Mind, 1890, 15, 
380 -381. 
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Instead he resorted to what Piaget has called "une sorte de 
probabilisme psychologique": a sampling of tasks that was as wide 
as it could be in the time available for testing and yet that was not 
random since it was guided continually by his own sense of fitness. 
His sampling was remarkably successful: unfortunately so perhaps, 
since its very success may have discouraged the sort of further inquiry 
that would have been most valuable. But this is no fault of Binet's. 
His own ultimate aim was to come to understand "la nature mane de la 
pensée" and he would never have rested content with the success of 
his tests, which he produced to serve an immediate practical purpose 
and for which he made the most modest and cautious of claims. 
After his death a succession of immediate practical purposes 
occasioned the production of a whole series of tests based on a whole 
series of samplings that were not random and yet not guided by 
articulate theory. The question of how to choose the critical points 
and justify the choice was very frequently avoided; ana this avoidance 
was indeed encouraged and applauded - directly or indirectly - by a 
number of writers. 
An interesting example of indirect encouragement comes from the 
writings of Gilbert Ryle who argues in "The Concept of Iand" that to 
regard "theorising" as the essential activity of the intelligent mind 
is a mistake, and proposes to reveal it as a mistake by showing that 
11. 
"theorising is one practice amongst others and is itself intelligently 
or stupidly conducted. "1 The last phrase makes it very evident 
that his argument rests on the confusion of mode and status, for the 
fact that theorising can be performed in an unintelligent manner is 
no argument against regarding it as the essential activity of the 
intelligent mind. The issue here is not, of course, whether Ryle 
is correct in rejecting theorising as the mind's essential activity. 
The point is that his argment, if sound, would make it impossible to 
regard any sort of activity as more important in the estimation of 
intelligence than any other sort, since, whatever sort was suggested, 
it would be true that it could be performed in an intelligent. or 
unintelligent way. 
An example of direct encouragement is to be found in Alice Heim's 
recent book "The Appraisal of Intelligence ". She devotes a consider- 
able part of her book to the question of test validation, and she 
expresses approval of Binet's test construction procedure on the 
grounds that: 
"Binet was concerned to find some exact, external criterion with 
which to compare his test findings. As is well knomn, he observed 
and made use of the fact of mental development. Having noted that a 
normal child of six, for instance, can do things which a normal child 
1. G. Ryle: Concept of Mind, p. 26. 
Library, 1949. 
London: Hutchinson's University 
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of five cannot achieve, and that the six -year -old tends to fail on 
tasks which the normal seven -year -old can manage_, he took 'success at 
age X' as his criterion. "1 
I would be very far from wishing to object to approval of Binet's 
emphasis on the fact of mental development. But to imply, as Heim 
does, that this by itself provides an adequate validation criterion 
is to imply that every power that develops with age is equally important 
as an index of intelligence, and this Binet himself certainly did not 
believe. Nor, indeed, does Heim, for though she pays enthusiastic 
tribute to Binet's recognition that "intelligence manifests itself in 
a multitude of ways "2 she goes on later in the book to imply that not 
even all "cognitive matters" are to be regarded as "matters of 
intelligence ". This occurs in the course of her discussion of test 
reliability, at the point where she is considering the problem of 
possible intrinsic variability in the subjects tested. She says: 
"The evidence suggests that intrinsic variability is less 
in cognitive matters generally, and least in matters of intelligence 
specifically."3 
But how are these "matters of intelligence" to be distinguished? 
This is obviously the question that must be faced. It might be thought 
that every definition of intelligence would be an attempt to answer 
it; but when one -studies the many definitions of intelligence that 
1. A. Heim: The Appraisal of Intelligence. pp. 2L -25. (London: 
Methuen, 1954.) 
2. Ibid. p. 22. 
3. Ibid. p. 82. 
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have been proposed it becomes evident that some of them concern them- 
selves primarily with mode (as does Heim's own tentatively offered 
one, which perhaps explains why in parts of her book she seems so 
to overlook the vexed question of status). That is, intelligence 
is sometimes described not as a capacity to undertake certain sorts 
of activity but as a general tendency to act in a certain manner what- 
ever the sort of activity. 
It is interesting to discover, then, that if one considers state- 
ments that refer primarily to mode one finds much agreement among 
writers of great diversity. Here are a few instances: 
Galton, speaking of Cambridge wranglers, says that they are dis- 
tinguished by the fact that they "find their way at once to the root of 
the difficulty and with a few clean, apposite, powerful strokes, 
succeed in proving they can overthrow it It 
Coleridge, in one of the essays in "The Friend ", tells us that 
if we choose a "close reasoner" as our guide to "the su mmit and 
absolute principle" of a subject he "will ... take us the shortest 
way, will save us many a wearisome and perilous wandering ..." 
Heim's own suggestion is that "intelligett- activity consists in 
grasping the essentials in a given situation and responding 
appropriately to them." 
And Whitehead exemplifies the quality he describes when he says: 
"Style is the direct attainment of a foreseen end, simply and without 
waste:' 
u- 
The end may be of many different kinds, but the style of an 
elegant solution to a mathematical problem is essentially at one with 
the style of the best writing, painting or music, which is another 
way of saying that in all these activities intelligence may manifest 
itself. 
And yet this realisation, important as it is, does not help 
us to decide what to put in an intelligence test. It has indeed been 
made to serve as a refuse from the need for theoretical justification 
of the decisions made, though it cannot offer this escape with anything 
like convincing plausibility. The argument that it does not much 
matter what we test since it is the mode of doing that is important 
cannot be used to support present testing practice because mode is 
precisely what tests at present pay no regard to except in so far as 
mode is revealed by final result (which in the kinds of question 
comwonly used and in our present state of knowledge is very little) 
and perhaps in so far as credit is given for speed. There can be no 
doubt that there is some connection between speed and style; and yet 
the person whose manner of doing shows the greatest style or intelligence 
may be the quickest to reach a solution or he may not; for he may spend 
his time deliberating and planning and looking for the neatest and most 
satisfying way to proceed. What we need to know is not so much how 
long some one takes to reach an answer as how his time is spent. 
The desirability of knowing this would probably be acknowledged 
by most test constructors and users but it has generally been 
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considered obvious that the difficulties in the way of any attempt to 
estimate success except in terms of time taken and response made (in 
the sense of solution finally offered) are overwhelmingly great. In 
spite of this a few writers have been critical of the practice of 
studying only overt responses. Luchins, for instance, in the course 
of discussion of the " Einstellung" effect,1 argues that apparently 
identical responses may result from very different thought processes 
and that it may be quite unsafe to make inferences from the former 
to the latter; B. Othanel Smith, discussing the use of attainment 
tests, objects to the gross and superficial study of behaviour on which 
their construction usually rests. He goes on to express the belief 
that a more thorough study would reveal that "underlying events are 
distinguishable in terms of manifestations now slurred over in our 
gross analysis. "2 His hope is that searching preliminary studies 
would ultimately enable us to construct questions in such a way as to 
obtain even from the final answer alone much more information about 
the subject's whole response than we are at present able to do. 
Smith does not commit himself to any detailed proposals for the 
conduct of these studies. Though he attacks the practice of studying 
only final overt responses he is anxious to refute in advance any 
accusation that he is advocating a return to what he describes as the 
"barren methods" of introspective psychology. And at the end of his 
book he tells us that so far as he can see there are two directions 
1. A. S. Luchins: The Einstellung- effect as a test of rigidity. 
J. Consult. Psych., 1951, 15, 89 -94. 
2. B. Othanel Smith: Logical Aspects of Educational Measurement, p.123. 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1938). 
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in which mental measurement may advance: one towards the reduction of 
behaviour to simple elements by some such techniques as those of fac- 
torial analysis; the other towards the discovery of "critical points" 
of qualitative change and the construction of instruments that will 
record the reaching of them. These possibilities of advance he 
considers to be irreconcilable at present, although he dóes not over- 
look the possibility that some wider understanding may ultimately 
permit them to merge. He argues that meanwhile neither should be 
neglected, but he gives no more indication of how he thinks the 
second of the two might be pursued than he gave earlier in his book 
of how he thought the "underlying events" might come to be known. 




Smith talks of coming to know the "underlying events" but the 
word "underlying" is perhaps unfortunate. It suggests obscurity and 
inaccessibility, and while it may be that what is to be studied is 
both obscure and inaccessible it would be wiser to avoid prejudging 
the issue and to employ a more neutrally descriptive term. "Preceding" 
suggests itself since we are evidently concerned with sequence. It 
is clear that thinking takes time and that results are in some sense 
arrived at. Beyond this it is also clear, to continue the almost 
inescapable spatial metaphor, that a given result may be reached by 
more than one route. It is the possible variations of route, with 
all the false turnings and retracings, that are to be studied. 
Two questions at once arise: 
Is the thinker himself aware of these preceding events? 
And can an observer become aware of them? 
The second question is much more important than the first for 
the purposes of this discussion, and it is not so dependent on the 
answer to the first as might appear. But the first deserves some 
brief consideration. 
Though it has now been widely accepted that there occur in us 
mental processes of which we are unaware, it is only certain sorts of 
unconscious process whose existence is generally considered to have 
been established. I refer, of course, to the activities of the 
"forgotten" memories, the repressed desires, that constitute the 
18. 
"unconscious" of the psycho -analysts. This "unconscious" is usually 
thought of as a kind of repository, having "contents" that influence 
our lives in active ways, but of whose activity we remain completely 
unaware. They are generally held to exert their influence chiefly on 
emotional and physical functioning. However, since it is evident 
that the thought processes of a person cannot be sharply separated 
from the rest of his being, it has to be allowed that if there are 
unconscious processes at all they must influence thinking 
1 
at least 
in an indirect way. But this admission of indirect influence would 
not make it necessary to suppose that our actual thinking process is 
in any sense hidden from us. We must therefore ask what direct 
arguments can be advanced for the existence of unconscious thought. 
An obvious way to begin is by asking how it has been possible 
to produce evidence of the existence of the psycho -analytic un- 
conscious. The answer is that this has been done in the only way 
that could conceivably be conclusive: by bringing the uncoamdous 
into consciousness. It is only when we succeed in pushing back 
the boundaries of the totally unknown that we can know there is any- 
thing there to know. Before this, of course, we may have strong 
logical grounds for suspicion. We may be able to argue that only 
1. The activities of the psycho- analytic "unconscious" are, of 
course, sometimes considered to be themselves a form of think- 
ing, but so long as they are distinguished from intelligential 
thought this becomes a question ofdefinition only. I have 
considered it better to reserve the name "thought" for the 
latter. Piaget in "The Language and Thought of the Child" 
seems to adopt the other policy, for he distinguishes between 
"directed or intelligent" and "undirected or autistic" thinking, 
and to this distinction makes that beLvveen conscious and sub- 
conscious thinking correspond. But I have thought it unsafe, 
for the reasons given in the following pages, to claim that all 
intelligential thought is conscious. 
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the existence of something as yet unknown could explain what we observe. 
It was in this way that Leverrier discovered the planet Neptune. He 
argued that observed astronomical events could only be accounted for 
by the existence of a planet in a specified position, and it was 
subsequently possible to proceed to observations which confirmed his 
hypothesis. 
In a similar way, it would be possible to reason that only the 
existence of unconscious thought processes could explain what we observe 
in the study of thinking; and this sort of argument has in fact been 
advanced. It is most frequently offered in connection with what is 
known, with amusing contrast of metaphor, as "ins_Aration" or "incubation ". 
This is the fact, reported by many thinkers, that some of their best 
ideas seem to come suddenly "from nowhere ". But the argument that 
only unconscious thought processes dan explain this cannot be main- 
tained. Several other reasonable hypotheses have been suggested - 
among them simple recovery from fatigue, or from interferences that 
have previously been blocking progress - and so long as these have not 
been disproved, unconscious thought remains, an this evidence, only 
one of a number of possibilities. 
This same sort of argument was also used by the psychologists of 
half a century ago to explain some of their introspective findings. 
Ach, for instance, postulated the existence of unconscious "determining 
tendencies" to explain the way in which purposes lead to actions, and 
Binet argued that the "esprit critique" can function unconsciously in 
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the elimination of unhelpful ideas. The difficulty with such claims 
is that the kind of confirmation which the astronomers could obtain is 
not so easily obtained by psychologists. Leverrier's fellow 
astronomers could turn their telescopes in the direction in which he 
told them to look and see there the planet, as he had predicted. 
But in the case of thought what confirmation is possible? 
It may be helpful to consider again the evidence for the psycho- 
analytic unconscious. If a person declares that he has become aware 
of some early event that he had quite forgotten,the truth of his claim 
may possibly be verified in two ways: by a confirmation that this 
event did in fact occur as he describes it (though this is verifi- 
cation of an extension of consciousness only if one accepts that the 
subject had indeed entirely forgotten the event); or by the fact 
that from this moment his behaviour is observed to change in a may 
that is fully consistent with his claim that he now has new understand- 
ing. Though the former kind of verification is not possible in the 
case of unconscious thought processes there is no evident reason to 
suppose that the latter may not be. If one became conscious of 
thought processes of which one had formerly been unaware it would seem 
probable that one's thinking would alter in ways that would be 
observable in changed behaviour; and presumably there might be 
either facilitation or impediment according to the nature and role of 
the processes concerned. It is possible to conceive of thought 
processes that would be more efficient when they were unconscious; for 
21. 
it is well known that certain motor skills appear to be actually 
hindered by any attempt to think consciously about their performance. 
Here, however, a distinction must be made between noticing or not 
noticing what one is doing and crossing a real frontier between the 
accessible and the inaccessible to consciousness. In the case of 
motor skills there seems usually to be a gradual reduction of awareness 
as efficiency is acquired, but one can become aware again merely by 
"thinking what one is doing ", so that this unawareness is very 
different from a real barrier of unconsciousness. 
But though there are some acts which can best be performed 
unthinkingly after skill in them has been acquired, it seems certain 
that there will be at least one circumstance in which increased aware- 
ness - whether a real encroachment on the formerly unconscious or 
merely a better noticing - will tend to bring increased efficiency: 
and that is where the processes that were occurring unawares in some 
way involved error. A good example would be provided by any instance 
where reasoning depended on assumptions which the thinker was quite 
unaware of making, and which were mistaken. Until the existence of 
the assumptions was recognised the question of their soundness could 
not even be considered. 
The history of thought is full of instances where the discovery 
and questioning of assumptions have led to new advances; but it is 
clear that these discoveries are not easy to make. It is not enough 
simply to ask oneself what are the fundamental assumptions on which a 
conclusion rests. The answer is far from being clear as soon as 
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attention is directed to the problem. This suggests that here we 
have an instance of something in thought which can indeed lie beyond 
the reach of consciousness. But, if so, the bringing to light of the 
"contents" of this unconscious would seem to be in some ways very 
different from the exploration of the psycho -analytic unconscious. 
The latter is usually conceived of as an advance in depth, but the 
former would be better thought of as an advance in height. The 
contents of the psycho -analytic unconscious were once conscious, at 
least in some degree, but were "buried" and have to be "dug up" again. 
Unconscious assumptions, on the other hand, have presumably always 
been unconscious, and coming to know them is like reaching a higher 
point from which one has a wider view. 
It is clear, then, even from these considerations - though they 
raise only a few of the relevant issues - that a student of thinking 
processes would be quite unjustified in believing he could be sure that 
all the subjects of his investigation would be aware of the whole 
of their own thought. More important than this, however, is the 
question of the extent to which an observer can become aware of it; 
and this does not depend entirely on the answer to the first question 
because it is not an evident logical necessity that an experimenter 
should be aware only of such mental processes in his subject as the 
subject is himself aware of. A psycho -analyst would certainly claim 
to know of wishes and anxieties in his patient of which the patient 
had no knowledge at all. 
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The way in which the psycho- analyst would claim to come by this 
knowledge is important to consider. He would say that he does so by 
interpreting certain signs - signs which the patient himself can also 
observe but which he is unable to interpret: for instance his dreams. 
Now this claim appears to carry an important implication: that, in 
some measure at least, we know ourselves not with immediacy but through 
a process of interpretation that has very much in common with the way 
we know other people; so that it is not impossible for others to 
know us better than we know ourselves if they are more skilled 
interpreters. 
An important part of psycho- analytic theory is of course the 
contention when the signs for himself 
it is because of certain emotional resistances. But this does not 
affect the general implication of the psycho -analyst's claim, namely 
that the gaining of self- knowledge is in some sense an interpretative 
process, and one which we can learn.1 
1. Psycho- analystsmight object to this on the grounds that talk of 
"learning to interpret" suggests an intellectual process that can 
occur in the absence of the full understanding they would call 
insight. It is of course true that any interpretation may be 
"intellectual" in a pejorative sense. There is always the 
possibility of a substitute for live understanding - and this is 
true of the psycho -analyst's own efforts to interpret his patient's 
behaviour. He may, himself, merely apply a formula. It is the 
ease with which a formula can be made to serve as a substitute 
for understanding that has given rise to the pejoràt ive use of 
"verbal ", as well as to that of "intellectual ". But we would be 
acting very foolishly if this led us to reject words or scorn 
the intellect; or to suppose that all "learning to interpret" 
must be of this kind. 
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Strong support for this general notion comes from one who is not 
of the psycho -analytic company: C. S. Peirce, the founder of pragmatism 
in its original form and one of the first symbolic logicians. Peirce, 
in the course of a most effective attack on the Cartesian theory of 
innate ideas,1 argues that we have to learn to know ourselves, and 
that we do this by a gradual process of learning to interpret signs - a 
process in which the discovery of ignorance and error are of central 
importance2 and where advance depends on the criticism of other 
people and of that critical "other self that is just coming into life 
in the flow of time. "3 
In this way Peircd s arguments lead him to the interesting con- 
clusion that introspection is not su much an undesirable method of 
investigation as an impossible one. When some -one claims to intro- 
spect he is in fact interpreting signs that are not essentially 
different in status from those which he would be interpreting in the 
course of studying another person. 
Peirce argues in support of these ideas with great skill. But 
though they seem to invite the conclusion that there is no fundamental 
distinction between the methods of the "introspectionists" and those 
of the behaviourists since both proceed by way of the interpretation 
1. C. S. Peirce: Collected Papers, edited by C. Hartshorne and 
P. Weiss. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Univ. Press., 1931. 
Vol. V. § 213 et seq. 
2. See, for instance, Ibid. Vol. 5, § 233. 
3. Ibid, Vol. 5, § 421. 
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of observed events, to draw this conclusion would be to leave out of 
account the crucial consideration of the availability of these events 
for inspection by more than one observer. The question, then, is 
whether the signs which are available to us when we observe and 
interpret ourselves are also available - or can be made available - as 
signs on which others may exercise their interpretative skill, so 
that there may take place the process of discussion and amendment 
that leads to the agreement in which, to quote Peirce again, "the 
community ultimately' settles down . "1 
This question, when directed more specifically to the study of 
thought processes, amounts to asking whether the reports which a person 
gives of his thinking may be accepted as dependable signs, through the 
interpretation of which some knowledge of his thought may be obtained. 
And at this point another passage from Peirce becomes relevant - 
so relevant that it must be quoted at length: 
"A man goes through a process of thought. Who shall say what the 
nature of that process was? He cannot; for during the process he 
was occupied with the object about which he was thinking, not with 
himself nor with his motions. Had he been thinking of those things 
his current of thought would have been broken up, and altogether 
moc9;fied; for he must then have alternated from one subject of thought 
to another. Shall he endeavour, after the course of thought is done, 
1. Ibid. Vol. 6, § 610. 
26. 
to recover it by repeating it, on this occasion interrupting it, and 
noting what he had last in mind? Then it will be extremely likely 
that he will be unable to interrupt it at times when the movement of 
thought is considerable; he will most likely be able to do so only 
at times when that movement was so slowed down that, in endeavouring 
to tell himself what he had in mind, he loses sight of that movement 
altogether; especially with language at hand to represent attitudes 
of thought, but not movements of thought. Practically, when a man 
endeavours to state what the process of his thought has been after 
the process has come to an end, he first asks himself to what con- 
clusions he has come. That result he formulates in an assertion, 
which, we will assume, has some sort of likeness - I am inclined to 
think only a conventionalized one, - with the attitude of his thought 
at the cessation of the motion. That having been ascertained, he 
next asks himself how he is justified in being so confident about it; 
and he proceeds to cast about for a sentence expressed in words which 
shall strike him as resembling some previous attitude of his thought, 
and which at the same time shall be logically related to the sentence 
representing his conclusion, in such a way that if the premiss - 
proposition be true, the conclusion- proposition necessarily or 
naturally would be true".1 
This quotation from Peirce seems oddly at variance with some of 
his other contentions: for instance that "all thought whatsoever is 
1. Ibid. Vol. 2, gi 27. 
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a sign and is mostly of the nature of language. "1 Perhaps the 
explanation is that Peirce uses the word "thought" in two different 
senses: sometimes as process and sometimes as product. The above 
passage occurs in the course of an argument in which he is concerned 
to show that the logician's task is not to study the actual movement 
of thought but rather to criticise the results of thought. And since 
he remarks in the same connection that for all he knows or cares there 
may be a hundred ways of thinking in passing from a given premiss to 
a given conclusion, one might perhaps object that in this case he, 
as a logician, is hardly qualified to comment on the nature of 
thought processes at all. But this cannot be said of another writer 
who comes to express views that curiously resemble those of Peirce. 
The writer is Binet, i_n one of the last articles that he contributed 
to L'Année Psychologique2 - a paper in which he reaches the conclusion 
that the error which above all must be avoided is that of seeing the 
mind as a succession of states and not actions. Thought is not a 
series of images, it is an act of understanding, of interpretation. 
The old theory of mental life was "so rational" and supposed that 
"all can be explained, all is co- ordinated, all can be justified ... 
that reasoning is composed of premisses and conclusions and that one 
deduces the conclusion from the premisses and cannot arrive at the 
conclusion without having passed by way of the premisses." In 
1. Ibid. Vol. 5, § 421. 
2. A. Binet: Qu'est -ce qu'une émotion? Qu'est -ce qu'un acte 
intellectuel? L'Année Psychologique, 1911, 17, 1 -47. 
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contrast with this, the new theory is "a theory of action, according 
to which mental life is not at all a rational life, but a chaos of 
shadow crossed by flashes, something strange and above all dis- 
continuous, which has appeared continuous and rational only because 
after the event it has been described in a language which brings order 
and clarity everywhere; but it is a factitious order, a verbal 
illusion ..." 
If we study the reports that a person gives of his thinking, are 
we then exposing ourselves to the full force of this "verbal illusion "? 
Binet is not unaware of the irony of drawing his conclusion about the 
nature of thought from the results of introspective studies. His 
comment is: "Quel sujet de méditation pour ceux qui aiment philosogaher.:" 
But there are two things to notice: first, that both Binet and 
Peirce are specifically concerned with the possibility of having 
some -one describe the course of his thinking; and secondly that this 
implies for them a report given after the event. 
There is an alternative procedure which consists not in asking 
the subject to think and then describe but rather to make his thinking 
accessible to an observer by doing it "aloud ". We must now ask 
whether this method is free of the disadvantages to which Peirce and 
Binet refer; and also whether, if it avoids these, it has any others 
in its turn. 
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In the first place, the change from asking the subject to 
"describe" to asking him to "think" seems to meet Peirce's objection - 
since frequently made by others - that if the subject has to describe 
what he is doing, his "current of thought" will be broken up and he will 
be unable to think uninterruptedly because of the need to watch himself 
thinking. But this same abandonment of the request for description 
has another advantage that may be at least equally important, for it 
at once removes any likelihood of resort to the complicated vocabulary 
of logical terms in which we are accustomed to describe thought, and 
which may be so misleading from the point of view of psychological, 
as opposed to logical, inquiry. If there is no call to "describe" 
there will be no need to talk of "such things as judging, abstracting, 
subsuming, deducing, inducing, predicating ... "1 to quote Gilbert Ryle: 
terms which he says are appropriate to descriptions of results 
reached but which we all too commonly use in efforts to describe the 
ways in which we reach them. Be goes on to claim that it is because 
of this, and because we do not catch ourselves performing these acts 
which we "describe" in this way, that we conclude that these acts 
must be "very subterranean happenings ". And this might not be unjust 
as a comment on the conclusion of Binet's that has been quoted above. 
So then if we avoid this sort of terminology we may perhaps 
reduce a little the disparity between the word and the act of which 
Binet and Peirce were so aware; and we shall certainly make it possible 
1. Ryle, Op. cit., p. 285. 
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to use the reports of a great many subjects who could never have told 
us they had been inferring or subsuming. 
There is one further advantage that may be of some importance - 
one that derives primarily from the fact that when the subject "does" 
instead of "describing" his words are no longer retrospective. There 
is then no longer the same danger that they will misrepresent the 
course of thought because of the subject's forgetting what he did and 
being unable to retrace his steps with accuracy. But, on the other 
hand, it appears that in avoiding this risk we may incur another one. 
The finding of words may in itself affect thought, so that, though we 
no longer have the danger of inaccurate retrospection, we have altered 
the thought itself. 
This would seem to be one of the two main objections that can be 
brought against the "thinking aloud" procedure. The other is that 
thought may be too quick for articulated speech, so that we can only 
know by this means some of the resting- places, and never the actual 
movement of the thought between them. 
The force of the second objection depends on what one claims for 
the method. If one were to claim that by using it one could reveal 
the entire processes of thinking, then the force of the objection 
would be very great. But if one claims only that its use will 
enable one to discover more about the processes than would be possible 
from any study of the product, then the second objection is no longer 
valid; for even if one can know only resting -places, it is an 
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obvious advantage in mapping the route to have knowledge of the 
intermediate ones as well as of that which is finally reached when 
the journey is over. 
The first objection cannot be dismissed entirely. Undeniably 
it may be true that when a subject thinks aloud he will think in a 
way that is different from that in which he would other wise have 
thought. The best answer to a claim that differences occur which 
are of such a nature as to invalidate the method. is, I think, to give 
a preliminary illustration of the kind of evidence which can be 
provided by verbal utterance in the course of thought. 
In the illustration which follows, the words were spoken 
spontaneously and to this extent the situation is different from one in 
which "thinking aloud" is required. But numerous illustrations of 
the kind of evidence that may be obtained in the latter circumstance are 
provided in Chapter V of this thesis, where a report is given of 
studies in which the method of asking children to "think aloud" was 
employed. 
The example1 of spontaneous thinking aloud occurred in the course 
of the efforts of a girl of ten to do the Digit Symbol Test in the 
Wechsler Intelligence Scale. It should be added that there were 
reasons to suspect that she had some brain lesion, since EEG results 
revealed significant bilateral delta activity and spike discharges 
from the left hemisphere. 
1. I am indebted to Miss J. F. Reid for this illustration. 
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In the test, subjects are first presented with the following 
key: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
The test then consists in writing, below each one of a list of digits, 
the appropriate symbol. Before the test proper there is a 
demonstration list of seven items, three of which are completed by 
the tester and four by the subject, with help if necessary. In 
the course of doing these four, the girl commented on the difficulty 
of writing "L upside down" (see symbol for 5) but in spite of this 
managed to produce the symbol l with some encouragement. She then 
completed, slowly but correctly, the first seven test items. The 
eighth digit in the series was 2. In order to find the symbol for 
this, she looked back to the key; and it was at this point that she 
provided the significant verbal clue. She exclaimed: "Two plus T 
oh dear:" - and immediately put her hand to her head in understandable 
distress and confusion. Now it is evident that the+symbol for 3, 
and the E- symbol for 4 
1 
had combined with the digit 2 to form for her 
this pseudo -meaningful phrase. It is equally evident that it was the 
attempt to wrest meaning from this nonsense configuration which gave 
rise to the exclamation of distress. Her response leads me to 
wonder how often in school she had been expected to find meaning where 
she could see none. 
1. Cf. her remark on "L upside down ". 
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After a perplexed pause, she continued the test by copying the 
symbols in the order in which they are presented in the key, with 
no attempt to relate . them to the appropriate digit. Then she 
announced that she had finished. When urged to go on, she resorted 
to writing in each blank the digit from the space above, and went on 
doing this until the end of the test. 
It would obviously be too much to claim that the few words 
spoken reveal the entire movement of this girl's thought; but they 
do give an understanding of the nature of the breakdown that could 
not possibly have been gained from the study of her answer sheet 
alone. 
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Note on the method of "thinking aloud ". 
The method was first systematically used by Claparéde, and 
called by him " réflexion parlée". He describes it and distinguishes 
it from introspection in his article in Archives de Psychologie, 1933, 
24, 1- 154.; but he had previously indicated its use as early as 1917. 
So far as I am aware, the only other psychologist who has made 
any extensive use of the method is Duncker. A report of the 
studies which he conducted with its aid is published as a Psychological 
Review Monograph (1945, Vol. 58, No. 5) in translation by Lynne S. Lees. 
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CHAPTER III 
To decide that a study of thinking will be conducted by means 
of asking subjects to think aloud and then recording their words is 
not to have done with all procedural problems. Chief among the ones 
that this decision leaves untouched are those which concern the 
treatment of the protocols once obtained. 
The nature of the analysis that is made of these will be bound to 
depend in large measure on the specific questions that the investigator 
tries to answer. For instance, it would be possible to look, as 
Dunker did, for "solution- phases "; or follow Claparde in attempting 
to study how hypotheses are formed. But in the experimental work which 
will be described in later chapters the guiding question has been: what 
errors did the subject make? 
The reasons for this choice are several. In the first place, 
if one admits the method's limitations (see pages 30 and 31) one must 
allow that it may not be possible to discover by means of it what is 
the exact manner of the formation of hypotheses - as indeed Claparéde 
found;' and one must also acknowledge that some solution phases may 
altogether escape detection.2 But errors are salient; for while the 
very point at which thought "goes wrong" may not always be observable, 
the consequences are most unlikely to remain hidden for long. 
This is perhaps only a special case of application of the 
general principle that the study of faulty functioning makes a better 
1. This by no means led him to conclude that the method was valueless. 
On the contrary, he claimed it had very well revealed "les démarbhes 
de la pensée." 
2. Duncker fully recognised this. 
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starting point for inquiry than that of successful functioning, 
particularly when the subject of study is one of great complexity. 
The understanding of the healthy functioning of the body has waited 
on the study of pathology not only because of the great pressure to 
find remedies for ills. 
But even if this were not so, and the only advantage of studying 
dysfunction lay in the urgency of practical problems awaiting solution, 
there would be no less strong a case to be made on these grounds for 
directing research efforts to the study of error in human thought. 
Ignorance of the nature of obstacles to progress is itself an obstacle 
to progress and the more we know about what impedes thinking the more 
likely we are to be able to devise means of removing impediments and 
giving the kind of positive help that will be of most value. 
There are three main ways in which the study of errors may be of 
direct use in the development of intelligence testing. First, it 
may increase understanding of the manner in which the sorts of question 
at present in use actually function, and suggest modifications in the 
ways in which these are usually grouped ana classified by the test 
constructors. At present, where tests include homogeneous sub -tests, 
the claim for homogeneity is generally based on obvious formal resem- 
blances: all are "series" or "analogies" or something of the kind. 
But it has often been suspected that "psychological homogeneity" may 
in fact have a quite different basis, and the study of errors may 
reveal if this is so. 
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A second consequence of the study of errors may be that it will 
prove to have bearing on the realisation of the hope expressed by 
Smith (see page 15) that "underlying events" will be distinguishable 
on the evidence of final solutions once we have learned more about 
these events; and it may then become possible to construct problems 
in such a way that a certain find of error is invited and others are 
rendered improbable. It has to be recognised at the outset, though, 
that "improbable" can never be replaced by "impossible" in this 
context. 
Finally, the study may be able to contribute to the solution 
of the problem with which this discussion began and from which it may 
seem to have moved far: the problem of the sorts of question which 
should be included in an intelligence test. It may not be 
immediately apparent how it could serve this purpose, and in fact the 
belief that it might do so rests on an assumption that must be explicitly 
stated. But in my opinion the hope of finding theoretical justification 
for the choice of one sort of question rather than another rests on 
precisely the same assumption. 
Before stating this assumption, I must make it clear that I am 
implying a distinction between "theoretical justification" and 
justification by follow -up alone, that is, by the demonstration that 
a test "works" with a certain measure of efficiency for a given pre- 
dictive purpose. my reason for not calling the latter "theoretical 
justification" is that it provides no basis for predicting how well a 
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new and untried type of item will "work ". It remains perpetually 
ad hoc. To say this is not to suggest that follow -up can be done 
without. Follow -up in some form is quite indispensable for the 
development and verification of theory. But it cannot serve as a 
substitute for theory. 
The assumption, then, is that the acquiring of mental power is 
a process having order and coherence and advancing through a number 
of stages whose sequence1 is constant from child to child. This is 
not to assume that each child learns everything in exactly the same 
order - a proposition that would be manifestly false. The assumption 
is only that there are certain central and crucial powers to be 
acq»;red - crucial because many subsequent increases of power depend 
upon them. 
If this assumption is sound and such powers exist, then it is 
their presence or absence at a given age2 that an intelligence test 
should be designed to ascertain. And it is to their discovery that 
a study of errors may contribute, because this study should be a means 
of revealing at any stage what is the necessary but absent basis of 
progress, how the things which the child cannot yet do are related to 
one another as failures of power. If it could be shown that at a 
given age one type of error commonly accounted for failure to succeed 
1. It is of course conceivable - and not incompatible with the argument 
here advanced - that there might be a number of more or less 
independent sequences. 
2. We must not, of course, take it for granted that speed of advance 
through the sequence of stages - if a regular sequence exists - is 
unvarying; or that the child who is furthest ahead at any moment 
will necessarily remain furthest ahead. 
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in a variety of different tasks then this would be strong evidence 
that a "critical point" had been discovered. Verification would 
lie in the study of subsequent growth of power - that is, in follow -up, 
though not of a massed, total score, group -average kind. 
This will be more fully discussed in the following chapter. Here, 
however, it should be remarked that there is one great source of 
difficulty and complexity in the way of such a study: the fact that 
what is causing a child to fail to perform certain tasks successfully 
may be of a kind that would commonly be described as "non -intellectual ". 
To take one obvious illustration, there is evidently a distinction to 
be made between a slip of the tongue or the hand and an error that 
arises from a failure to comprehend. Susanne Langer points out: 
"Every piano player, every typist, knows that the hand can make mistakes 
where consciousness entertains no error. "1 And every human being 
knows that so can the tongue. Freud, of course, has his theories 
about the sources of "slips ". Whether he is right or not, it is 
evidently desirable to try to detect them and find means of preventing 
their occurrence. It may, however, prove to be very difficult for an 
investigator to tell in practice, even when the subject is "thinking 
aloud ", whether a mistake has the status of a slip or not, since it is 
necessary to admit the possible occurrence of slips of the eye, the ear,- - 
and even of the understanding itself, or at the very least of the 
I. Susanne. ,Langer: Philosophy in a New Key, p. 29 (Cambridge, ::lass: 
Harvard University Press, 1951) 
memory. Something we "know quite well" may be forgotten; some- 
thing we "understand quite well" may not be understood on a given 
occasion and in a given context. It is as important to recognise 
the existence of such complexities as it is not to allow them to 
prevent any study of thinking from ever being undertaken at all. 
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CHAPTER IV. 
Although the existence of complexities must be reco; raised, it 
may occasionally be necessary for a time to disregard them or force 
a way through them, especially if one suspects that a vast intricacy 
of foliage conceals a relatively simple structure of trunk and branches. 
Something of this sort Piaget may-be said to have done. Here is his 
own account of his policy, as given in his introduction to "Logic and 
Psychology " :l 
"The psychologist ... welcomes the qualitative character of 
logic, since it facilitates the analysis of the actual structures 
underlying intellectual operations, as contrasted with the Quantitative 
treatment of their behavioural outcome. Most "tests" of intelligence 
measure the latter, but our real problem is to discover the actual 
operational mechanisms which govern such behaviour, and not simply to 
measure it." 
No criticism of this policy or lack of admiration for its remark- 
able successes is implied by the fact that this chapter will be largely 
concerned with suggestions for ways in which theories as to the nature 
of the "builder operations" of the mind, as Piaget elsewhere calls 
them, can receive both verification and application through attempts 
to study in detail their relationships to "behavioural outcome ". 
Neither, it should hardly be necessary to add, is this intended to 
imply that Piaget did not arrive at his theories by way of the 
1. J. Piaget: Logic and Psychology. (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1953). 
42. 
observation of behaviour. The fact that he did, however, does not 
reduce the need for the tracing of the journey-back, which in its 
turn can be expected to contribute to further theoretical development. 
The opinion has already been expressed (see page 39) that 
follow -up studies of individual children should be used for the 
verification of the hypothesis that a "critical point" in mental 
development has been discovered. These studies may be of two kinds. 
They may consist in what I shall call passive follow -up: that is, 
follow -up where the investigator does his best to make sure that all 
the children concerned have, so far as this caxi be controlled, the 
same "opportunities" in the period which falls between his first and 
second study of them, but where he makes no attempt at any active 
experimenting during this time. Sometimes this is the only kind of 
follow -up possible. For instance, if a study were intended to verify 
a prediction of school success under ordinary circumstances, as it so 
often has been, any intervention by the investigator would defeat the 
purpose. If, however, the research were intended to verify a theory 
that a critical point in the development of power had been discovered, 
then to take action based on the theory and designed to encourage the 
development would be a very good may of submitting the theory to test, 
provided that a parallel passive follow -up were also conducted. And 
if a major purpose of the whole inquiry were precisely to find ways 
of encouraging this development then active follow -up would obviously 
be indispensable. But it would be unlikely to be fruitful till much 
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preliminary work had been done, and if it were attempted too soon 
its results might too easily be dismissed as negative. 
In addition to these methods of inquiry, there is another which 
may be of particular importance and value, though surûrisingly little 
use has so far been made of it. But before this is described, 
attention must be drawn to an incomatibility which appears to exist 
between Piaget!s views and those of Binet. The assumption that there 
exists a constant sequence in accordance with which the central powers 
of the intelligence develop' is at the heart of Piaget's theories. 
Against this assumption we have now to set Binet's famous opinion - 
subsequently endorsed by numerous clinicians - that "a defective child 
does not resemble in any way a normal one whose development has been 
retarded or arrested. "2 Binet goes on: 
"The retardation of his development has not been uniform. 
Obstructed in one direction, his development has progressed in others. 
To some extent he has cultivated substitutes for what is lacking. 
Consequently such a child is not strictly comparable to a normal 
child younger than himself. So far as certain faculties are con- 
cerned, he remains at the level of a younger child; but in respect 
to others, he is on a level with normal children of his own age. An 
unequal and imperfect development is consequently his specific 
1. The theoretical importance of this assumption has been considered 
on pages 37 and 38. 
2. A. Binet and Th. Simon: Mentally Defective Children p. 13, 
" (Translated by W. B. Drummond. London: Edward Arnold, 19114-.) 
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characteristic. These inequalities of development may vary to any 
degree in different subjects." 
Now if there were one developmental ladder of intelligence, each 
rung of which could be gained only from the rung below, then a defect- 
ive child would equal in the actual extent of his powers at any given 
moment the younger "normal" children with whom at this moment he 
was sharing a rung. (This is not to say, of course, that he would 
equal them in his probable future climbing power.) So any such concept 
as this is clearly not in accord with Binet's opinion. If, however, 
there were a number of ladders, would this make reconciliation possible? 
Piaget does sometimes talk in ways that would seem to be 
compatible with this latter conception. He allows for developments 
in parallel: for instance, of what he calls the logico- arithmetical 
operations on the one hand and the spatio -temporal on the other. But 
between these parallel developments he finds a close cónnection.: His 
different ladders are not independent, " puisque ce sont les mémes 
opérations, mais a une autre échelle. "1 In this case, any gross 
discrepancies of position on the different ladders would seem at the 
least improbable, and one would certainly expect the defective child 
to be retarded on them all. 
Yet it cannot be denied that in clinical practice marked inequalities 
of development are often observed. And apparent inequalities even 
1. J. Piaget: La Psychologie de l'Intelligence p. 173 (Paris: 
Armand Colin, 1947) . 
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within the groups that Piaget brackets together - for instance 
" logico- arithmetical" - are of the most common occurrence. 
The conflict may be partly resolved by the distinction made 
by Piaget himself in the passage quoted on page 41 - the distinction 
between underlying operations and behavioural outcome - if Piaget 
may be said to be studying the one and Binet the other; for the 
relationships between the two are obviously very complex. (For 
instance, behavioural outcome must include the effects of those "slips" 
of the tongue and hand that were briefly mentioned at the end of 
the last chapter.) And the conflict may further be seen to resolve 
itself into a question concerning status, as is obvious as soon as 
one asks: If two children are "equally unequal" in development, but 
differently uneval - that is, "backward" or "normal" in respect of 
different powers - are we to say they are equally intelligent? If 
we cannot always say so, then inequalities of development, though they 
will remain as clinical symptoms, will not necessarily be inconsistent 
with the notion of a central and invariable progression. 
But when all this is said, it remains true that the inequalities 
are most marked, and at present, for the clinician, most perplexing. 
And one way in which they might be studied is by the explicit comparison 
of the "normal" child with the "retarded" older one and with the 
"advanced" younger one. If it were then found that some powers keep 
very much stricter pace with chronological age than others do, then 
inequalities both in the very dull and in the very bright would be 
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accounted for, and much light might be thrown on the significance of 
particular patterns of retardation and advancement. 
Further,Binet's claim that one finds among defective children 
"peculiarities of understanding, reasoning, imagining .... which do 
not appear to have their equivalent in younger normal children" could 
be put to the test.1 
An interesting example of a comparison of this kind is provided 
by a study of reading processes conducted by Lloyd M. Dunn and recently 
published by Child Development Publications as a monograph of the 
Society for Research in Child Development.2 Although in many ways 
valuable, this study is in one way of greatest value as a warning. 
The investigator begins by equating mental age in his two groups. 
Then, as a result of part of his study, he writes: "It seems reasonable 
to conclude, insofar as one is able from small samples and using a 
non -standardized measuring instrument, that educable mentally retarded 
boys in special classes are markedly inferior to normal boys of the 
same mental age in their ability to use context clues. "3 From this one 
might conclude that mental age is independent of ability to use context 
clues, since it is possible for children to be equal in one and markedly 
different in the other. Yet the test of ability to use context clues 
consists of filling in blanks in sentences, the last of which "was very 
difficult, being modelled after the Minkus completion item on the 
Revised Stanford-Binet, Form L." And the mental age measure used was 
the Revised Stanford -Binet, Form L. If, then, the children are markedly 
1. A. Binet & Th. Simon: Op. cit., p. 13. 
2. Lloyd M. Dunn: A Comparison of the Reading Processes of Mentally 
Retarded and Normal Boys of the same Mental Age. Monograph of the 
Society for Research in Child Development, 1954, Vol. 19, No. 1. 
3. Ibid., p.55. 
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different in respect of ability to use context clues we must surely 
regard with some caution the statement that they are equal in mental 
age. The questions which this experimental result invites but which 
do not seem to have been asked are, first: if the children in the normal 
group had been younger chronologically but of the same intelligence 
relative to their age - ideally, though of course impossibly, if the 
experimenter had been able to compare the performance of the retarded 
children with that of the normal group when the latter were younger - 
would he still have found differences? Or would there have been a 
point when the performances of the two groups were in fact equal? And 
again: if he waited till the retarded children were older, would a point 
ever come when their performance was as good as the original performance 
of the normal group? 
The finding of answers to these questions (using new groups, of 
course, to investigate the first of them) would amount to an extension 
of the chronological age gap between the two groups in a search for 
limits of inequality. Perhaps no limits would be found especially 
in the case of the increase upwards. And, of course, analysis of errors 
might show that even when there was equality of score there remained 
differences of mental process that could not be considered trivial. 
One might find in the defective group those "absurd errors" to which 
Binet attached so much importance, and which he even tried to encourage 
because of what they revealed. 
A further extension of the investigation of inequalities of 
development could take the form of the study of children known to suffer 
 
from some specific sensory or cerebral defect: the spastics, the 
aphasics, the blind and deaf from birth. This is another way in 
which knowledge of the normal may be augmented by study of the abnormal 
and by subsequent comparison of the two,. 
Such studies would again be very relevant to Piaget's work 
because of his emphasis on the importance of the sensori -motor stages 
in the early development of intelligence. His theories sugLest many 
questions to be asked about the development of those who suffer from 
serious sensory or motor disabilities: for instance, what is the effect 
of the spastic child' s inability to manipulate objects with anything 
like the ease and skill of the normal child? If Piaget is right in 
stressing the importance of performance of the physical action, then 
the effect on the whole development of intelligence should be very 
severe. 
In a recent paper in Acta Psychological in which he re- affirms 
the importance of manipulation and considers it in relation to the 
development of propositional thought, Piaget reports that he and his 
colleagues have been undertaking some studies of deaf-mutes, to see - 
to what extent their disadvantages in the learning of any form of 
language have affected their thinking, holding it to the lower levels. 
He reports that features characteristic of the more elementary ways of 
thinking are found to subsist in their thought. Remembering the triumph. 
of Helen Keller, one feels that it is wise to be cautious in discussing 
1. Jean Piaget: Le langage et la pensée du point de vue génétique: 
Acta Psycholgica. 1954, 10, 51 -60. 
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the limitations that sensory defects impose. But it is evidently very 
important that more work of the kind which Piaget reports should be 
undertaken, both so that the nature of the limitations may be understood 
in relation to general theory and so that the handicapped child's efforts 
to overcome them may be helped in every possible way. 
The studies that have been suggested in this chapter have one 
unfortunate characteristic in common: that they would be very laborious 
and time -consuming to conduct. But perhaps we shall have to accept 
that in the study of human thinking there are no short -cuts, and no 
substitutes for the most detailed observation. 
I shall finish this chapter by mentioning one problem to which I 
do not at the moment clearly envisage the application of the methodo- 
logical suggestions I have been making. The problem, moreover, is one 
that lies at the very heart of the general topic of the chapter: the 
study of the connection between mental operations and behavioural outcome. 
Piaget tells us that he analyses the "structures underlying 
intellectual operations ". But as soon as we attempt to pass from them 
to behavioural outcome we encounter the question of the availability 
of these operations for use in actual situations. We have to ask: 
if two people "possess" the same operations are they sure to be able to 
make use of them equally well when presented with a problem in the 
solution of which the operation has a part to play? The question of 
"slips" is again obviously relevant here. But the problem manifests 
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itself more generally also. Consider, as illustration, the following 
series: 
1 0 2 3 3 8 4 
If one observes by studying the first pair of digits that the 
quantity -1 is involved in the relationship between them, and if one 
then, in accordance with that principle of reversibility which Piaget 
declares to be the essential characteristic of organised and developed 
intelligence, recognises that the addition of 1 to the second digit of 
the second pair will facilitate the detection of the other relationships 
involved, one is likely to notice quickly enough that 2 is the square 
root of 4, and that 3 is the square root of 9 - whereupon one immediately 
has the whole principle of the series: 
12 -1, 22 -1, etc. 
But in an actual experiment in which two people took part, one 
was able to solve this problem and the other was not, although both, 
beyond any question,had long since reached the stage of establishment 
of what Piaget calls "the group composed of the sequences of positive 
',and negative whole numbers:' The difference seemed to lie in the fact 
that one of them could make use of the +l / -1 transformation, while the 
other could not. 
I do not propose to try to suggest here how such differences as 
this can be directly studied because it seems probable that the under- 
standing of them must wait on many other discoveries concerning the 
nature of thinking. But until they are explained we are certainly 




The experimental work to be reported in this paper consisted in 
an application to the study of the problem -solving efforts of a 
small group of children of the "thinking aloud" procedure described 
and discussed in Chapter 2. For the reasons given in Chapter 3, 
attention was directed particularly to the study of the errors made. 
These, of course, might, and often did, occur in the course of 
thinking which finally led to a correct solution. To avoid confusion, 
therefore, the following terminology will be used throughout the 
report: "error" for any detectable flaw in reasoning whether leading 
to a right or a wrong conclusion and whether or not subsequently 
corrected; "solution" - right or wrong - for the conclusion 
finally reached; "answer" for the entire overt reply, including 
both the solution and the spoken thought preceding it. 
Selection of the Experimental Group 
Twenty children were chosen to form the experimental group. 
Each child had previously taken two Moray House Tests of Intelligence 
(M. H. T. 52 and 53) at an interval of a year, as part of the normal 
procedure for secondary school selection. The second test had been 
taken approximately four months before the investigation began. 
The standardised score of each child fell within the limits 
115 ± 3 on each test, so that, as far as group test total score 
could indicate, they were of very nearly "equal" intelligence. 
52. 
This seemed desirable because it was thought that a first study 
of the errors made by a small group of children would give a 
better indication of the worth of the method and of the further 
work that might most profitably be undertaken if the range of 
ability was narrow. Comparisons would then be easier to make 
and some indication would be gained of the extent of differences 
not revealed by the total group test scores. These differences 
would perhaps be of importance in later follow -up studies. 
The choice of a range centring on 115 was, of course, 
arbitrary; but the score has a special claim to attention since 
it is so commonly taken as the selection 'borderline ". 
The ages of the children were between 11 years 9 months and 
12 years 3 months. There were 15 girls and 5 boys. It would 
have been preferable to have the age -range even narrower, and the 
proportion of girls to boys more nearly equal; but the test -score 
requirement, which was given priority, narrowed the possible 
choices so severely that a more rigorous insistence on age -equality 
and sex - balance would have made it necessary to draw the twenty 
children from almost as many schools. This in turn would have 
made the inquiry impossible, as it had to be done in a very limited 
period of time before the children were transferred to secondary 
schools. 
As it was, the group was drawn from four schools, which will 
be referred to as K, L, M and N. 
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The following table shows the numbers taken from each of 
these schools: 
TABU', 1. School Boys Girls Total 
3 t 7 
L 1 3 
I:T 0 5 5 
r 1 3 4 
Total 5 15 20 
Procedure 
The children were first given eight specially constructed 
group tests of twenty four questions each. Each test was 
"homogeneous" in the ordinarily accepted sense - that is, each was 
composed of questions of one formal type: analogies, classification 
items etc. The types used are listed on page 56 and the tests 
are given in full as an Appendix. All the types are currently in 
use in Moray House Tests. So far as was possible the questions 
were actually drawn from existing tests (excluding 11iT 52 and 53, 
which the children had already taken) but in some cases a few 
new questions had to be introduced to make up the number; and in 
the case of Test VII an alteration was made. (See pages 8- and 85). 
Group testing took place on two separate occasions, four tests 
being given on each. So as to eliminate any effect on average 
results of the order in which the tests were taken the children were 
divided into four groups and the tests to be given on the first 
occasion were arranged to form a Latin Square, thus: 
Group 
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Order of Tests. 
2. 3. 4-. 
w I II III N 
X III N I II 
Y II III IV I 
Z N I II III 
The four remaining tests, V, VI, VII, VIII, were similarly 
arranged on the second occasion of testing. It would have been 
possible to rotate tests I to IV with tests V to VIII so as to 
eliminate any effect of differences "between occasions" on the 
average results, but this would have had an attendant disadvantage: 
children might then have learned something from other children 
about tests which they were to sit on the second day. 
Allocation of children to groups was random, except that care 
was taken to ensure that each school had - as nearly as possible - 
equal representation in each group. The allocation is shown in 
Table II (see opposite p. 58). 
Eleven minutes was regarded as the standard time for each 
test, since in a full Moray House Test of 100 questions the time 
allowed is 45 minutes. After eleven minutes the children were 
asked to draw a line under the last completed question. They 
were then allowed to continue. Circumstances made it necessary 
to impose a final limit of 18 minutes but in all but a few instances 
this was more than enough to allow all questions to be attempted. 
Timed and virtually untimed scores were thus obtained. 
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This preliminary group testing served both as a guide' to the 
selection of the problems which were later to be given to the children 
during interviews, and as a means of ensuring that the interviews would 
be conducted not by a complete stranger but by someone whom the children 
had met on at least one previous occasion.2 Also of course it was of 
interest in its own right as a further indication of the children's 
ability. 
When the group test results had been studied, a list of fifteen 
problems was prepared and each child was interviewed and asked to 
solve these problems, "thinking out loud" as he did so. Everything 
he said was written down, pauses being noted. Occasionally he was 
asked to explain something he had said, but otherwise interruption was 
avoided as far as possible. Each interview took approximately an 
hour. The children were told at the start that the purpose of the 
inquiry was not to assess their ability but "to find out how to 
make better tests ", and they seemed to accept this without question. 
Also they knew by this time what the results of the selection procedure 
had been. The selection "borderline" in Edinburgh is below 115, so 
by far the greater number had been allocated to full senior secondary 
courses. Those who were not to take such courses had preferred not 
to do so. No child appeared to be unduly anxious or in any way 
antagonistic to the testing. 
1. See page 61+. 
2. I conducted all the interviews and at least the first testing 
session at each school. The time in which the experimental 
work had to be completed was so short that it was necessary to 
have some help from students in the Diploma in Education class 
for the rest of the group testing. 
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The Group Tests Used. 
Test I: "Alphabet" questions. (The alphabet is printed with these 
questions for reference.) 
Example: "If all the letters of the word G I B E were 
removed from the alphabet, which would be 
the sixth letter of those remaining ?" 
Test II: "Elimination" questions. 
Example: A, B, C, D and E are five girls. 
A and E are tall; the others are short. 
C, D and E swim; the others do not swim. 
A and C play tennis but not golf; the others 
play golf. 
Which of the tall girls plays tennis? 
Which of the short girls does not swim? 
Which two girls play golf and swim? 
Test III:.ènalogies. 
Example: Fire is to heat as lamp is to .. 
(flame / candle / see / light / soot / dark) 
Test IV: Classification items, where the exclusion of terms which "do 
not belong" is called for. (This type of question will 
be referred to as "classification (excl.) ") 
Example: Find the two that are most like each other but 
different from the others and underline them: 
Foot / pound / minute / inch / gallon 
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Test V: Alphabet series. A printed alphabet is provided. 
Children are instructed to find "the rule which tells 
how one letter or group of letters is found from 
those coming before or after it" and then complete 
the two blank spaces. 
Examples: H, K, N, - -, 
2[V, YM, XL, - -. 
Test VI: Classification items, where the class name is to be 
picked out from a list of class components. Children 
are instructed to find "the general word which describes 
the others ". 
(These will be called "classification (nam;ng1 ") 
Example: Rake / saw / hammer / chisel / tool / hoe 
Test VII: Coding questions. 
Example: Below are five words in a secret code. 
They mean: 
WHILE, SMILE, WHALE, ALIVE, WHEAT 
but not in that order. By comparing them, especially 
their beginnings and endings, you can find the meaning 
of each. Write the meaning in the brackets. 
1. Y J C N G ( 
2. U O K N G( 
3 . C N K X G ( 
4 . . Y J G C V ( 
5. Y J K N G ( 
SCHOOL PUPIL GROUP 
K. 1 Ian W 
2 Irene W 
3 Carole X 
4 Douglas X 
5 Pat Y 
6 Morag Y 
7 William Z 
L. 1 William Y 
2 Anne W 
3 Nancy X 
4 Rita Z 
M. 1 Jeanette Z 
2 Pat Z 
3 Fay Y 
4 Linda X 
5 Elizabeth W 
N. 1 Margaret X 
2 Pat Y 17 
3 Margaret Z 
4 Ian W 
Alphabet Elimination 
I II 
T U d T U d 
22 23 1 9 17 8 
19 19 0 17 17 0 
16 21 5 17 18 1 
12 14 2 6 10 4 
17 23 7 15 21 6 
20 23 3 15 15 0 
17 18 1 8 12 4 
21 22 1 17 17 0 
22 22 0 20 22 2 
20 24 4 7 11 4 
21 24 3 15 20 5 
22 23 1 8 15 7 
14 14 0 7 11 4 
15 22 7 6 9 3 
16 16 0 10 17 7 
17 22 5 9 14 5 
18 18 0 18 18 0 
20 3 16 22 6 
19 23 4 11 16 5 
24 24 0 9 19 1c 
Totals x 369 415 
Means i 18.45 20.75 





20 20 0 
21 21 0 
22 22 0 
23 23 0 
20 20 0 
18 18 0 
20 20 0 
24 24 0 
20 20 0 
23 23 0 
24 24 0 
22 22 0 
20 20 0 
19 19 0 
19 19 0 
19 19 0 
22 22 0 
24 24 0 
22 22 0 
240 321 425 425 
12.00 16.05 21.25 21.25 
4.49 3.81 1.97 1.97 
T = Timed Scores; U = Untamed Scores. 
If Test VLliaomitted, the mean of this child's scores is 19.29(timed) and 20.14(untimed); 
1 If the scores of William (K7) are omitted, the mean of teat liais 16.74(timed) and 17.68 
TABLE II 
Classification Alphabet Series Classification Coding 
IV (excl.) V naming VI VII 
T U d T II d 
18 18 0 19 20 1 
16 16 0 17 17 0 
18 18 0 11 20 9 
20 20 7 13 6 
16 16 0 21 22 1 
16 16 20 20 0 
23 23 23 23 0 
17 17 18 18 0 
22 22 0 
19 24 5 
24 
y* 0 
20 20 0 
21 21 0 
17 17 0 
24 24 0 
16 16 0 
21 21 0 
22 22 0 
18 18 0 
18 18 0 
20 20 0 







13 17 4 
5 17 12 
21 21 0 
23 23 0 
18 18 0 
16 16 0 
17 21 4 
14 17 3 




T U d 
18 18 o 
23 23 '0 
23 23 0 
24 214 0 
24 24 0 ï 
23 23 0 
23 23 0 
22 22 0 
24 24 0 
21 21 0 
23 23 0 
23 23 0 
22 22 0 
23 3 0 
19 19 0 
24 24 0 
7 7 0 
23 23 0 
23 23 0 







T U d 
o o o 
15 15 o 
4 17 13 
O 4 4 
17 17 0 
16 16 0 
23 23 0 
19 19 0 
24 24 0 
12 12 0 
15 24 9 
10 15 5 
10 12 2 
11 20 9 
O 3 3 
O 13 13 
10 11 0 
11 20 9 
5 5 0 




the standard deviation is 5.20(timed)and 3.93(untimed). (See p.63) 
untimed); the standard deviation is 4.55(timed) and 4.29(untimed). (See p.60) 
Related $ 
VIII 
T U d 
19 19 o 
20 20 0 
21 21 0 
13 18 5 
19 19 0 
13 18 5 
0 1 1 
12 13 1 
23 23 0 
15 15 0 
19 22 3 
23 23 0 
12 14 2 
9 10 1 
16 16 0 
16 16 
8 8 0 







T U d 
128 138 10 
147 147 0 
131 159 28 
104 125 21 
152 165 13 
143 151 8 
a 
135 141 6 
146 148 2 
179 181 2 
135 148 13 
157 177 20 
147 164 17 
108 128 20 
126 146 20 
125 135 10 
121 144 23 
114 115 1 
142 164 22 
140 152 12 






IT xtI xd T U 
16.00 1725 1.25 7.21 6.85 
18.38 18..38 0 2.45 2.45 
16.38 19.88 3.50 5.83 1.90 
13.00 15.62 2.62 7.95 6.24 
19.00 20.62 1.62 3.12 2.78 
17.88 18.88 1.00 3.14 2.93 
16.88 17.62 .74 8.02 7.28 
18.25 18.50 
22.38 22.62 .24 1.58 1.32 
16.88 18.50 1.62 4.78 4.82 
19.62 22.12 2.50 3.43 2.32 
18.38 20.50 2.12 6.38 3.81 
13.50 16.00 2.50 5.92 3.90 
15.75 18.25 2.50 6.02 5.14 
15.62 16.88 1.26 7.02 5.78 
15.12 18.00 2.88 6.90 3.50 
14..25 1+.38 .13 4.71 4.61 
17.75 20.50 2.75 3.60 2.00 
17.50 19.00 1.50 6.40 5.98 








Test VIII: Related series, where the child is required to 
arrange items in serial order in accordance with a 
postulated regular serial relationship. 
Kample: "If all large coins were worth more than 
smaller ones, which of the following would 
be worth most ?" 
(a halfpenny / a sixpence / a shilling / a farthing / a penng) 
"If all small creatures could travel faster than 
larger ones, which of the following could travel 
fastest ?" 
(snail / greyhound / shark / eagle /fly) 
Of these, analogies and classification questions have probably 
the longest history and are still today very widely used by 
intelligence test constructors. Alphabet questions, alphabet series 
questions and "elimination" questions have been in regular use in 
Moray House Tests for a considerable time. Coding questions in one 
form or other have for long been included also, but the type used 
here has only quite recently appeared regularly. A few questions 
of type VIII have been used from time to time. 
Group Test Results. 
Table II gives the results of the group testing. 
It was originally proposed to use analysis of variance to test 
the significance of differencesbetween tests and be Lween children, but 
59. 
when the tables of results had been compiled it was decided by 
inspection' that the variance was not sufficiently homogeneous for 
this analysis to be legitimate. 
However, the widely differing score variances were in them- 
selves a result of some interest. The tests where scores tend to 
cluster most closely together are III, IV and VI (analogies and the 
two kinds of classification). The standard deviation of III is 
particularly small and no child scores less than 18 out of a possible 
24. The same is true of VI except that there is one low score of 7 
which, since the number of children is small, has appreciably 
affected the standard deviation. (If this score is omitted, the 
mean for Test VI becomes 22.53 and the standard deviation drops sharply 
to 1.57.) Test IV spreads rather more widely, several children 
having scored 16. In all three tests extra time has made no 
difference: timed and untimed scores are the same in every case. 
In fact most children had completed these tests and looked over their ans- 
wers in five or six minutes of the eleven allowed for the timed scores. 
Many children said they found them very easy. 
These findings lead to the question of whether items of these 
kinds in the current Moray House Tests can be affording discrimination 
at any port above the intelligence "level" of this group of children 
(c. 115, as judged by M.H.T. total score). It should be 
1. I am grateful to Dr. D. N. Lawley of the Department of Statistics, 
University of Edinburgh, for his opinion on this matter. 
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noted, however, that the children had previously taken two Moray 
House Tests, so that there was presumably some practice effect; 
also that they were above the average age for taking the tests and 
that we are dealing here with raw sub -test scores for which no age 
allowance could be made. Further, since the Moray House Tests are 
not Vernier Tests designed to discriminate at high levels, but are 
rather intended to give equal discrimination over the whole 
intelligence range, the presence in them of some sets of questions 
which do not discriminate at all above a standardised score of 115 
cannot be considered surprising. 
Yet, in spite of all these considerations, this result does 
suggest that it might be important to make a particularly close 
study of the discriminating power of these types of Question, 
particularly since they are so extensively used. (See also p. c2) 
By far the widest spread is that of the scores on Test VII, 
where the whole range is used. Test VIII would apear at first to 
be runner -up for this distinction, since it also has one timed score 
of zero; but this one score was found to have resulted from a 
misinterpretation of test instructions, as will be explained in the 
report on individual testing (see p.10;). It may, therefore, be 
misleading to include it. Without it, the timed mein for VIII is 
16.74, and the untimed mean 17.68. Standard deviations are 4.55 
and 4.29. 
It will be observed that Tests II and VII have lower timed 
means and show bigger mean gains with removal of time limits than do 
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any other tests. Tests II and VII would appear to have this at 
least in common: that they necessarily involve a sequence of 
deductive steps, with progressive elimination of possibilities. 
Errors made on these two types of problem during the interviews 
were closely similar. (See pages 69 to 71. and 86 to :=,-0; also 
final discussion, pages 138 and 139.) 
It was important to discover whether group test results 
seemed to indicate that any school differences were present. 
Although, for reasons stated, no complete two -way analysis 
of variance could be carried out, it was possible to take the total 
scores of the children and analyse variance between and within 
schools. When this was done the variance between schools was found 
to be non -significant. Similarly it was possible to test 
"between- school" variance taking the scores on one sub -test at a 
time, but again no significant differences were found. 
Consideration of test means and variances was followed by a 
scrutiny of child scores. A quite cursory examination of Table II 
shows that these children, selected for homogeneity of total score 
on a Moray House Test, have widely differing total scores here. 
The range is 101 - 179 (timed) and 115 - 181 (untimed); and this 
corresponds to a range of mean scores of 13.00 - 22.38 and l4..38 - 22.62 
respectively. It is unfortunate that the measure of statistical 
significance of differences between children which analysis of variance 
would have provided is not available. But even if it were it would 
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not answer the question which it would seem most important to ask: 
are these differences significant with regard to prediction of a 
child's future success in school? It is to be borne in mind that 
the tests used here are of kinds in use in current Moray House 
Tests, but here each type is receiving equal weight, whereas in 
the full Moray House Test weights are very differently distributed. 
The types which usually carry most weight in the full tests (in 
the sense that they are included in the greatest numbers) are here 
represented by sub -tests I, III, IV and VI. Now I, III, IV and 
VI are precisely the tests which spread this group of children 
least widely, and their timed mean scores for these four tests 
taken together are as follows: 
K. 1 20.25 L. 1 20.00 M. 1 23.25 N. 1 15.50 :x 
^ 2 19.50 2 22.50 2 18.50 2 20.50 
3 19.50 3 20.50 3 19.75 3 22.25 
4 19.50 4 21.00 4 19.00 1f 22.75 




* This is the child with the very low score on VI. See p.59) 
It would seem, then, that something of this nature is happening: 
these children gain very similar scores on the test items which 
form the main part of any Moray House Test; they succeed in very 
dissimilar measure with other types of problem, but these are 
represented in the Moray House Tests in fairly small numbers and 
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considerable variety. It would aopear that the closely similar 
total scores1 are a result of real similarity in test performance 
on certain major types of question and a compensating, balancing 
effect produced by unequal performances on the remaining parts of 
the tests. (It should be remembered, of course, that a complete 
test contains a greater variety of questions than is represented 
by the 8 sub -tests here) 
The children vary considerably in the extent to which they 
are able to increase their total scores with extra time. One 
child (Irene K2) makes no gain on any tests; another (Carole K3) 
adds as much as 28 points to her total. (This is equivalent to 
a gain of 14..7 on a test containing 100 items and was made in 
63.6% extra time) Consider also, Anne (L2) and Ian (N4). On 
untimed score they are in very close competition for the highest 
mark, but there is considerable disparity between their timed totals 
since one gains 2 and the other 20 with timing removed. 
Again, there is considerable variability in the amount of 
spread of children's scores. And while children's scores 
cannot properly be compared in respect of spread when they are scores 
on unstandardised tests, the differences are worthy of notice because 
they may prove to be of interest later in connection with f ollov ip 
studies. The highest standard deviation of timed scores is 8.022 - 
but this is for the child who, because of a misinterpretation of 
1. It should be recalled that it was similarity of IQ on Moray 
House Tests that formed the basis for selection of the group. 
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instructions, scored zero on Test VIII (see p.109). When the 
standard deviations of his scores are calculated without Test 
VIII they are: 
Timed: 5.202 
Untimed: 3.928 
The highest timed standard deviation then becomes 7.953 - that of 
Douglas (K4) who also has the lowest timed mean. And the lowest 
timed standard deviation is 1.575 - that of Anne(L2), who has 
easily the highest timed mean. There is not, of course, any 
necessary connection between low mean and high standard deviation: 
the scores might well be consistently low. (In this case of 
course if all scores were low it would be hard to see how the child 
had come to be included in such a selected group at all. As it is, 
Douglas (K4) has high marks on III, IV and VI, and particularly 
poor ones on II and VII.) But there is a necessary connection 
between a mean as high as 22.38 and a narrow spread of scores, 
because of the 'ceiling' of 24. 
The Interviews. 
The consistently high marks obtained by the children in 
tests III, IV and VI made it seem unlikely that it would be 
profitable to include questions of these kinds in an inquiry where 
interest centred on the study of errors. The same was true, to a 
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lesser extent, of test I, and after some consideration it was 
decided that only II, V, VII and VIII should be represented in the 
list of interview problems. This meant that time was available 
for inclusion of a few questions of other kinds. In the end the 
list was composed as follows: 
A: Elimination (Group Test II): four questions 
asked about the one set of data. 
B: Alphabet series (Group Test V): two with 
paired letters, one with single letters, the 
latter running in the opposite direction to 
the alphabet itself. 
C: Coding (Group Test VII): a group of five words. 
D and E: Two problems where a piece of information 
essential to the solution was not provided. 
The child had to say what it was necessary to 
know before a solution would be possible. 
Problems of this kind have never been used in 
Moray House Tests. 
F to I: Related series (Group Test VIII): four 
problems. 
J to 0: Deductive problems of various kinds, some of them 
requiring deduction from "nonsense" premisses. 
A few problems of this kind are currently in use 
in Moray House Tests; but the actual questions 
used in this enquiry were specially devised for 
the purpose. 
These problems will now be discussed arie by one in the order in 
which they were given to the children, except that J will be considered 
66. 
immediately after D because of a particularly close relationship 
be l.ween them. 
Table III gives the solutions offered by each child. 
Children will be referred to by Christian names accompanied 
by the school initial and number from Table III. In quotations 
of children's answers, round brackets contain words spoken to the 
child by the interviewer, and square brackets contain comments 
and explanations to the reader. 
az E. S. 
SCHOOL PUPIL 
PROBLEM A -
1 2 3 
C. N. TH RI,PK HI,GH P1. Tr Pa. Gr. Hu. 
B C 
1 2 3 1 2 3 4 5 
+ IR,xP + + + + + + 
N.H. + + + + + + + 
EL'.îS. SI,QK GH,FG + Pa. Hu. + Ti. 
+ + IH,HG + + + + + 
+ iiS,IR + + + + + + 
+ + + + + + + + 
T.I. + IH,HG + + + + + 
+ IR,xP HI,HG + + + Hu. Gr. 
+ + + + + + + 
x + + + + 
2 + + + + 
3 W + + + 
4 + + + + 
5 + + + + 
6 + + + + 
7 + + W 
L 1 W + + + 
2 + + + + 
3 + + + + 
4 + + + + 
M 1 + + N W 
2 W + N C 
3 + + + + 
4 + + + + 
5 + W + s 
N 1 + + N W 
2 + + + + 
3 + + + + 
4 + + + + 
+ + + + + + + + 
+ QJ,NM + + + + + + 
U.G. 5G,IQ + Pa. + Pl. + + 
S.H. + + Pa. Gr. Pl. Hu. Tr. 
+ + + + + + + + 
+ RI,PL GH,EF + + + + + 
+ + LI,MH Pa. + Pl. 
- + + 
+ RI,KP + Pa. Not completed. + 
H.T. + + + + + + + 
+ + + + + + + + 
+ + + + + + + + 
TABLE III 
Time of 
Which of the two (M. or J. is the older /younger 12,10 Murder 
Su. Sa. M. C. 4,5 5 3 2 5 2 
Notes: The sign + indicates that the right solution was ultimately given, though in 
many cases after correction of previous errors. The nature Of wrong 
solutions is indicated, in abbreviated form where necessary: thus, in the 
case of problem A, W stands for West School, N for North School, etc; in 
ppoblem C, Pa. stands fer "patch ", Hu. for "hutch" etc; in F to I, E stands 
Wnich4s older ( +) + A 
If it said "She is 3 years older than Mary ". ( +) 10,12 A 
What age one of the girls was. ( -) + A 
Which one was the older. ( +) + + 
If they said one girl was the older. ( +) + A. 
Which is the youngest of the two. ( +) + A 
Find out which was oldest. ( +) 20,12 A 
If it says she is 3 years older than May or Jean. ( +) 20,18 1, 
Which is oldest. ( +) + + 
What girl she was 3 years older than. ( +) 12,7 A 
How much older the girl that was 2 years younger than Betty... ( -) 13,8 A 
Which one was 3 years or 5 years younger. ( +) + A 
We need to know which is which. ( +) + A 
Could give no reply. ( -) + A 
Could give no reply ( -) 5,1 A 
Thought no more information necessary. ( -) + A 
Which one was 3 years older (sic) ( -) 20,18 A 
Which is 3 years younger. ( +) + A 
The ages of J. and M. combined. ( -) 12or10,7 + 
If they told which one. ( +) + + 
for "elephant ", Si. for "silk ", N. for "nylonP in G and for "nail" in I, and so on; in problems J to 
0 the number of the alternative chosen is listed. In problem D an extract from the child's answer 
is given and the bracketed + or - shows whether he was considered to have offered an acceptable 
solution to the first part of that problem. Finally, in the case of problem E, the letter A 
indicates that the right solution was not reached without assistance from the interviewer and that 
the answer was similar in form to the one quoted in full as an example on p. 104. 
+ N + N 
+ +_ 
+ + + + 
+ + + + 
+ + + AC 
+ + + + 

















4,5 5 5 2 1,2 
+ 1 5 2 no answer 
+ 1 5 2 + 
4 1 5 1 + 
4 1 5 2 + 
4 1 + 2 + 
+ 1 1 + 5 
+ 1 1 + 4 
+ 1 1 + + 
4 4 1 2 + 
4 1 1 + + 
1 1 2 + 
4 1 4 3 4 
4 1 1 2 no-answer 
+ 4 1 4. 2;5 
4 1 1 1 + 
+ 1 1 3 + 
4 1 1 + + 
4 1 + + + 
+ 1 1 . + 
PROBLEM A: 
67. 
Five boys, Jack, Dick, James, Bob and Tom 
go to five different schools in the same town. 
The schools are called North School, South School, 
East School, West School and Central School. 
Jack does not go to North, South or Central School. 
Dick goes to West School. 
Bob does not go to North or Central School. 
Tom has never been inside Central School. 
1. What school does Jack go to? ( ) 
2. What school does Bob go to? ( ) 
3. What school does James go to? ( ) 
¿. What school does Tom go to? ( ) 
There seems to be little possibility of wide differences in 
method in this problem. The reasoning has to run: "He does not 
go to V, W or X; and he can't go to Y because we know so - and - 
so does; therefore he goes to the only one remaining, Z." 
It would be logically possible to proceed by elimination of 
boys instead of schools - i.e. to say: who goes to South School? - 
not Jack, nor Dick etc.. But, as the question is framed, very 
little headway can be made by this means alone, and the wording 
clearly invites elimination of schools. However, occasionally there 
were signs of an attempt to eliminate boys, for instance Elizabeth 
(M5) in her answer to (3) says: 
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"That'll be Central - because Bob didn't go to North or 
Central, and Jack didn't go to Central and Tom was never in 
Central - so it must have been James that went there." 
All the children showed that they had a general grasp of 
the principle of progressive elimination of possibilities. 
Here is an example of an efficient answer, with which subsequent 
quotations may be compared: 
Pat (N2): (1) "It's not North, South or Central, and 
Dick goes to West - so it's East. 
(2) Not North or Central, not East, nor West - 
so it's South. 
(3) Not West, South or East. [She repeated this.] 
I think it's Central. (Why ?) Because Tom 
has never been inside Central. 
(4) Not Central, South or East or West - so 
it's North." 
Four children made no errors at all in the course of dealing 
with these questions; nine went wrong at some point but corrected 
their errors and eventually produced the right solutions; the 
rest gave at least ane wrong solution. 
In the making of the following classification all detectable 
weaknesses in reasoning were noted, even where a wrong solution 
did not actually result, or where an error was made and subsequently 
corrected. 
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Notes on Errors in Problem A. 
(1) One of the most common errors in this problem was incomplete 
surveying of the possibilities. This will be called " incomplete 
elimination ". Here is an example: 
Pat (M2): "He doesn't go to North, South or Central, 
so he goes to West." 
The existence of the East School is forgotten or ignored.' 
When this error occurred it was usually, but not always, the 
East School which was neglected. Presumably this was because the 
East School is not actually mentioned in the four statements which 
are the starting - points of deduction. 
It seems probable that if names that did not so readily 
form a set had been used this error would have been even more 
frequent. On the other hand it is just possible that a set 
might sometimes be misleading. In this instance, the idea of 
four points of the compass might lead to the neglect of one of the 
five schools. This would be interesting to investigate. 
(2) Progress in this question depends in considerable measure on 
the child's ability to use his awn solutions in answering further 
problems. Sometimes there was failure to do this. 
1. And this, of course, involves contradiction of the premiss 
concerning Dick. See note (7), p. 73. 
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Pat (K5) (answering A2) :. "It's not North or Central, nor West 
because of Dick. That leaves South and East." 
Pat had just solved Al correctly by deducing that Jack went 
to the East School. 
(3) There occurred, in the answers of seven children, what seems 
best described as a loss of hold on reasoning as it progresses. 
A conclusion is reached and then promptly contradicted, apparently 
because it has been immediately lost. (Only cases where the loss 
was almost immediate have been included in this category.) 
Douglas (K4) (answering A3): "Not West, nor East, nor South - 
so that leaves Central, North and West - no, Dick goes to 
West. So Central, North - no, South, Central ... oh, dear: 
It's getting more complicated." 
Douglas eventually gave correct solutions to all four interview 
questions, but his group test score for this sort of problem was 
low: 6 timed, 10 untimed. He remarked: "I find these difficult. 
Usually I think about them so long." No other type of error 
could be detected in his answers to Problem A. Notice that Douglas 
has the lowest total timed score. 
(4) In one or two cases there occurred abandonment of reasoning. 
A child would proceed by deduction for some part of the way towards 
a solution and then suddenly resort to apparent guessing. 
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Elizabeth (M5) (answering A4) : "Tom has never been to 
Central, so he must have been to North or South. It'll 
be South (How do you know ?) I don't really know." 
It should be added that Elizabeth had failed to answer A2 
correctly, and thus did not have readily available the information 
which should have enabled her at this point to eliminate "South ". 
But the significant feature of her response is the readiness with 
which, instead of attempting to get the -information, she accepts 
a guess as a substitute for logical certainty. 
This tendency will receive further comment later. 
(5) Several children introduced irrelevant pieces of information. 
This did not necessarily produce error, but was liable to lead to 
confusion. In the following example, however, it appears as a 
real break -down of deduction. 
William (L1) (answering A2): "Bob ..., it's not North or 
Central. [Pause.] South. (How do you know?) Well, Jack 
doesn't go to North, South or Central. Bob doesn't go to 
'North or Central. Dick goes to West. Tom has never been 
in Central. So that leaves Bob to go to South." 
William appears to have attempted to eliminate boys - that 
is, to establish that, since the other boys don't go to South School, 
Bob must. He succeeds in eliminating Jack and Dick, but then he 
makes the quite irrelevant statement that Tom has never been in 
Central School. This obviously tells us nothing about whether 
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Tom might go to South School. Of course, it is possible that 
William was failing to deal adequately with this negative, and 
was treating it as a positive statement that assigned Tom to 
Central School (see (6) below); but the fact that the statement 
is irrelevant at this point remains. 
This example provides illustration of the manner in which 
different errors may interweave. William is also guilty of 
incomplete elimination since he makes no mention of James (who, 
of course, is not mentioned in the four premisses). Yet in 
spite of this William's final solution is the correct one. It 
has to be recognised that, particularly since his account of 
how he came to his solution followed a request for explanation, 
it is possible that he had had more justification for his 
conclusion than he was able to say. 
(6) The statement: "Tom has never been inside Central School" 
was a special source of difficulty. It seemed to be much more 
troublesome to some children than the other negative statements in 
the form: X does not go to Y school. For instance, Margaret (N3) 
reaches a point where she is left with Tom and James on the one 
hand, and the Central and North Schools on the other. She then 
says: "If Tom has never been to Central, there is only one left. 
So James goes to North School ". Rita (L4) uses almost identical 
wording in reaching the same conclusion: she, too, calls North 
School "the only one left ". (Both girls later corrected this 
error.) 
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This raises the question of whether the cifficulty is due 
to the wording, or to the nature of the problem situation itself. 
If the statement had read: "Tom does not go to Central School ", 
would there still have been difficulty? Possibly there would, 
because although no similar difficulty arose in the handling of 
the statements: "Jack does not go to..." and "Bob does not go 
to... ", they had to be used differently. They were direct 
starting -points for inquiries concerning their own subjects 
'Jack' and 'Bob'. But here we have an inquiry concerning James 
(who does not appear in the statements) and the starting -point is 
a negative statement about Tom. Yet, if that statement had been 
quite straightforward - "does not go " - there might 
have been less likelihood of error. 
It is impossible to say at present, but this is a question 
which could very easily be investigated if two differently 
worded versions of the problem were used; and this would seem to 
be the kind of information with which test constructors should 
be equipped. Very little is known about the effects of small 
differences in wording. Another example of a similar kind will 
be mentioned later. 
(7) It will have been observed that this problem could very 
readily invare the children in contradiction, either of one of their 
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own earlier solutions or of one of the given pieces of information.1 
Contradictions arose in various ways. Sometimes they resulted 
from incomplete elimination; sometimes from the use of previous 
solutions which were themselves wrong. 
There appear to be great differences in the extent to which 
children are prepared to attempt to correct themselves when they 
notice contradiction. Some clearly regard a solution, once arrived 
at, as "taboo" - not to be touched further under any circumstances. 
Here is an.example of a girl who does correct herself. Instances 
of children who do not will be given later. 
Anne (L2) (answering Al and A2): "Jack - not North, South or 
Central, so cut these out. Only West left, that's the one. 
[Error caused by incomplete elimination. Contradiction of 
premiss] Now Bob - not to North, or Central - leaves 
South, East and West. If Jack goes to West - no! Dick 
goes to West! Then it must be East for the first answer. 
So Dick goes to West, Jack to East, Bob not to North or 
Central - that leaves South." 
Anne had the highest score on this type of question in group- 
testing, and also the highest total group test score. 
1. See, for instance, the example in Note (1), where the 
conclusion that Jack goes to the West School contradicts the 
given information about Dick. 
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PROBTFi.I B: 
A BCDEF GHIJKLMN OPQRS TUV:YX'.LZ 
1 Q, N, 
2. XO, VE, TG, 
3. h'L, JK, IJ, f 
The questions chosen for use in this part of the investigation 
were selected after a study of the wrong solutions in the group test 
had suggested that many of the children had difficulty if the series 
ran in the direction opposite to that of the printed alphabet; and 
also - as might have been anticipated - that a double letter series 
usually gave rise to more trouble than a single letter one. 
All the children showed that they had a general understanding 
of the principle of extending a series. There were, however, some 
differences in method. The main division was between those who 
tried to establish a principle, explicitly stated, and those who 
relied on rhythmic chanting thus: Margaret (N1): 
B (1) "K. L M ; fi t O P R S T - K J I H" 
The same child solved B (2) by this method, treating it as two separate 
series. (She made the error of reversal of order, however, See 
note 2, p.78) She was the only one to treat B2 in this way, but 
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chanting was very common in (3), where it seemed to be particularly 
helpful. Children who read aloud: "EL, JK, IJ ...." were usually able 
to continue: "HI, GH ...." without much hesitation. A count shows 
that 13 of the 20 children chanted Number 3 with little or no statement 
of principle (except perhaps a remark like "go back "). Of these, 10 
were correct. Of the 7 who tried to state the full principle, !_ were 
correct. Most of the attempted statements were somewhat inadequate, 
like that of William (K7): "It's just one forward all the time - the 
first letter of what you did last time." It is hardly surprising 
that this did not help him much. 
One other method difference is to be noted. It concerns question 2 
where there was a division between children who established the "miss one" 
principle, and applied it directly, and those who, realising that the 
numerical series 3 : 5 : 7 : 9 was involved, laboriously counted 9, and then 
ll letters from the beginning and the end. Six children were notably laborious 
"counters ". One (Carole K3) actually tried at first to count the letters 
between X and C, between V and E etc.. This is probably worthy of special 
note, and further inquiry. The children in the latter group all certainly 
know that nine is two more than seven, but fail to act confidently on the 
knowledge. It is as if the equivalence 7 + 2 = 9, though known, is not 
so firmly established as to be quite taken for granted, but still needs 
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confirmation; or as if the children fail to see that the 7 is part of 
the 9, so that when they count 9 it is the same 7 and 2 more. This 
suggests that there may be some connection with an error that was 
observed in other problems and described as "exclusion" or difficulty 
with overlap. (See p.95 ) It is obvious that counting from the 
beginning or end of the alphabet is time -consuming and also liable to 
lead to slips. It may be significant that among the six "counters" 
are the children who gained 12, 9 and 5 in the group test when the time 
limit was removed. On the other hand, some of the "counters" made no 
gain in score. 
Notes on Errors in Problem B. 
(1) As already mentioned,it was suspected from a study of group test 
results that some children have serious difficulty when direction is 
reversed, as in B1. In the interviews only two children actually 
gave a wrong solution that seemed to be due to directional difficulty, 
but three others showed signs of hesitation. It was noticed that 
the first space in B1 gave more trouble than the last. It seemed to 
be easier to read Q - N - K - H than to fill a blank space coming 
before Q with a letter which in fact comes after Q in the alphabet. 
If this is a general rule it could be of value to those concerned to 
devise series questions of varying degrees of difficulty. 
Irene (K2) gives an answer which illustrates this: 
"Q to N - two letters, N to K - two letters. So two 
letters back from Q - N. No I don't think it could 
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be. H is the second one all right Two letters before 
Q - that's N." 
The final conclusion: "that's N", was spoken in a puzzled tone; 
but she wrote N on her answer sheet. Apparently the notion "before" 
or "back from" Q was too strong to be overcome. 
This may be taken to provide another example of the inability, 
already mentioned in discussion of problem A, to reject one's own 
reasoning even where it is in quite evident conflict with some known 
datum. It is plain that Irene recognises that it is not really 
satisfactory to have the series read N, Q, N (There is no 
suggestion that she has envisaged the possible complicated series 
N,. Q, N, K, N, K, H, K, H ....) Yet she will accept this 
solution, instead of concluding that she is wrong and examining her 
reasoning critically. 
(2) In B2 and 3 there was sometimes reversal of the correct order 
of the two letters selected as solutions: 1R was written instead of 
Rl, and KP instead of PK. This may be a special case of the error 
discussed above in Note I. Possibly it would not have occurred at 
all in B2 if the series had been: CX, EV, GT, ... ... When it 
did occur the child was asked whether it mattered which letter came 
first. Only one child (Pat - K5) replied that it did not matter; 
and she added quickly: "Oh, well - here it's got the end one before 
the beginning. I didn't notice that." (Because correction of 
these errors was the result of such very direct questioning, 
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they are shown as wrong solutions; in Table III) 
(3) Miscounting of the "gap" was a common error. Sometimes it 
seemed to be due to concentration on getting the direction right. 
In these cases it was perhaps akin to the tendency to "lose hold" 
that was described in connection with problem A. More commonly 
it was due to inconsistency about the inclusion in the count of the 
final letter. Thus 0 might sometimes be said to be two letters 
from L, and sometimes three. 
Jeanette. (Ml) : says: "How far Q is from N - 3 places. 
So another 3 from K will be G " 
It looks as if the child is a victim of the ambiguity of the language 
she is using, and is not recognising that "3 places from" may be 
varyingly interpreted. 
.(4) There was failure on the part of one or two children to appreciate 
the overlapping nature of Series 3. 
Linda (Mr+) says: "JK, IJ, GH, and EF . " 
Carole (K3) gives GH and FG as her solutions. 
This error may have some affinity with the error described as 
"counting" and discussed on pages 76 and 77. Difficulty with overlap - 
of quite different kinds - occurs in many later problems. 
(5) One child seemed to be applying a wrong principle. 
Elizabeth (M5) gave, as her solution to (3), LI and MH. 
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She seemed to be moving out on either side of the pair JK, but 
her explanation was confused to the point of incoherence, and it 
was not really possible to discover how she arrived at this 
conclusion. Another child (Pat - K5) stated the numerical 
series in B2 as: 3, 5, 8, 9. She completely ignored the given 
item TG, and gave as her solutions HS and IR, which she changed 
to SH and Rl after questioning, (See Note (21) 
PROBLEM C: 
81. 
TRUTH, HUTCH, PATCH, PLACE, GRADE 
1. R N C E G 
2. VTUVVJ 
3. R C V E J 
1. ITCE G 
5. JWVEJ 
In this problem there were marked differences of method. 
These will be considered first in some detail. 
(1) In the first method a few letters are identified by comparison. 
Then words are identified by deduction from this. 
Pat (K5): "Number (1) and number (4) must be 'place' 
and 'grade' because they have G at the end and the 
others have J. Number (5) must be 'hutch' because 
it has J at the beginning and the end. So U = 
Any other with U in it? 'Truth'. So (2) is 'truth' 
because it has VV third. If V = T then (3) must be 
'patch'. So (1) is 'place' because P = R. So (4-) 
is 'grade'." 
This answer will be seen to involve: 
(a) Study of the frequency and position of occurrence of a letter 
in different words. 
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(b) Study of the frequency and position of a letter in the same 
word. (This is only possible of course when the same letter occurs 
more than once.) 
(c) Utilisation of new information gained when the identity of a 
word has been established; thus, "hutch" is identified because of 
the double H, then from this identification comes the realisation 
that U = W, which in turn is used to identify "truth ". 
These are the three main ways of applying this general method. 
Some answers, like the one quoted, made use of all these means. 
Many depended principally on (a). (It should be noted that the instruc- 
tions invite the use of 1(a).) Fifteen children used method (1) in 
some form. Two of these, however, supplemented it by other methods. 
There are differences between children with regard to the use 
which they make of frequency and position clues respectively. Most, 
of course, use both, but there is a tendency for more attention to be 
paid to frequency. Sometimes this goes so far as to amount to a 
completes ignoring of position. 
Ian (K1): "Number (2) has a lot of v's, so it must be one 
with two letters the same. That might be 'hutch' or it might 
be 'truth'." After a pause Ian did go on to use position 
clues to eliminate one of his "possibilities ". 
An example of unusual attention to position is the following from 
Pat (N2) : 
CNymbers (1) and (3) have been identified as "place" and "patch ". 
It remains to discover which is which.] 
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"The sign for A will be the third one back in one of them 
and second in the other. Number (3) has C as second 
letter and number (1) has C as third letter. So (3) 
is 'patch' and (1) is 'place'." 
A noteworthy feature of this answer is that it predicts what 
"will be" and then looks for that which accords with the prediction. 
No other child did this. It suggests a confidence in the certainty 
of deducible consequences that was rarely observed during the inter- 
views. Pat scored only 11 on the timed group test, but rose to an 
untimed score of 20. It is of interest to compare Pat's handling of 
this question with her answers to the later syllogistic problems. 
She gave the correct solution to problem 0, hesitated between the 
correct choice and a logical fallacy distractor in problem N, and 
chose logical fallacy distractors in L and M. A discussion of her 
answer to N is on page 121. 
2. Method (2) is similar to method (1) but is more thorough in 
the application of the principle of elimination. By this method it 
is first of all established that (1) and (3), say, must be "patch" 
and "place ". The next step, however, is not to find out which is 
which, but to establish in a similar manner that (2) and (4) must 
be "truth" and "grade ", and that, therefore, (5) must be "hutch ". 
The procedure is repeated so that one word is "odd one out" every time, 
and is thus identified. 
This method is quite sound theoretically, but is apt to be 
cumbersome in practice. Its successful use demands the ability to 
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retain a firm hold on deductions already made, and slips can easily 
occur. Two children used it exclusively without complete success; 
one other made use of it along with 1 (a) and (b) and was very 
successful indeed. 
3. This method is also similar to method (1), but the swift 
deduction of word identity from knowledge of the identity of a few 
letters is lacking. Instead each letter is identified laboriously 
by "between -words comparison" and written in the appropriate space. 
In this way the words are built up gradually. 
This procedure is obviously very slow. Only one child, 
Margaret (N3), adopted it and even she did not carry it through to 
the when words were almost complete 
Her timed group test score on this type of problem was 5; she made 
no gain, however, when allowed more time. Scrutiny of her script 
reveals that she completed the first set of words correctly and then 
wrote nothing mare until 18 minutes had passed. She did not 
adopt particularly slaw methods in solving the other interview 
problems and she distinguishes herself by her successes in problems M 
and N. For her an swers to these problems see pages 117 and 122. 
4.. Finally there were two attempts to establish a coding principle 
and one girl made some attempt at it while proceeding mainly by another 
method. It should be explained that there generally is no coding 
principle to be discovered in questions of this nature in Moray House 
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Tests; but for the purposes of this investigation it was thought 
desirable to introduce principles both in the group tests and in the 
interview-problem to see whether any attention was paid to them. 
The code in problem C was accordingly based on the principle A = C, 
B = D, C = E and so on. 
Both children who looked for a coding rule started with the 
risky assumption that the coded letters must be alphabetically "near" 
1 
the original ones. They happened, of course, to be right in this 
case; but both were, to begin with, satisfied with a very vague notion 
of "nearness ". All went well for them till number (0 was reached. 
The correct answer to (4) is "grade ", but though G is "near" I, H is 
evainearer. Thus both children began by identifying (4) as 
"hutch ". The proximity of T and U strengthens this solution; 
but a comparison of the third letters completely undermines it. 
One child, Irene (K2), made this comparison and was sufficiently 
self -critical and flexible to abandon her original notion. In the 
course of correcting herself she did in fact arrive at an adequate 
statement of the true principle involved, thus: 
"There's a letter between from H to J, from U to 's'ìß, from T to V ..." 
The other child, William (Ll), though he paused and looked dis- 
turbed when he came to the third letter of number (4), could not 
abandon his original hypothesis. His answer will be considered 
1. This might possibly be the result of familiarity with alphabet series 
in which nearby letters quite frequently provide the solutions. 
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during the discussion of errors. 
There is one further word to be said about method. One or 
two children showed real awareness of alternative methods of pro- 
cedure. For example, Douglas (I4) says: 
and we've had T, so V is T, so number (4) is patch." 
Then he adds: 
"You could also find it out with the 'h' at the end." 
Some of the others, though not so explicit, showed by their 
answers that they had a fine, flexible appreciation of possibilities. 
It is surprising that Douglas's group test script seems to 
indicate that he proceeded by a slow and laboured identification of 
each letter as in method (3). He made no errors but had only 
identified four words in 18 minutes. Perhaps, although he recog- 
nised the possibility of alternative methods, he did not realise 
that some ways would be quicker than'others. He appeared to be 
helped by the personal nature of the interchange of question and 
answer in the interview. 
Fourteen children identified all five words successfully. Of 
these, five made errors and either corrected them or, as may fairly 
readily occur in this type of question, were correct in spite of 
them. 
Notes on Errors in Problem C 
Errors were found to be closely similar to those made in 
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Problem A. This was of much interest, particularly because of the 
resemblance in score - pattern of the corresponding group- tests, II 
and VII. (See p. 61) 
(1) Incomplete elimination of possibilities was noted in the answers 
of six children. For instance, Morag (K6) decides that "A is repre- 
sented by V" because (3) and (5) have V as third letter, and "place" 
and "grade" have A as third letter. She has failed to take account 
of the fact that (1) and (4) have C as third letter and that con- 
sequently A might be represented by C. 
(2) Failure to use information already gained did occur here as 
in A but on one occasion only. One child (Elizabeth - M5),having 
identified four words, proceeded to try to identify the fifth, letter 
by letter. It was plain that she did not do this in order to check the 
correctness of her previous solutions, because she did finally show 
surprise at the realisation that if four were correctly identified 
the identity of the fifth could be in no doubt. In point of fact 
she was wrong in two of her earlier solutions, but wrong in such a 
way that if she had identified the fifth as the only one left she 
would have been correct in this fifth, placing - that is, she had 
placed the four correct words in spaces (1) to (4) although two of 
them were in the wrong order. (See note (4) below.) When she 
than tried to identify the fifth word letter by letter she found, 
of course, that this could not be done in a way that would accord 
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with her earlier decisions. But eventually, having realised that the 
fifth word would be the only one remaining, she gave the answer "hutch" 
and ignored the lack of accord. This then may also be regarded as 
an instance of the error referred to in note 6. 
(3) There were one or two instances of loss of hold on reasoning, in 
the form of immediate contradiction of assertions made. 
(4) Abandonment of reasoning occurred again, in one case very interest- 
ingly. 
Elizabeth (M5): "There's two P's and the rest different - 
and two R's. So (1) and (3) must be 'patch' and 'place'." 
This was apparently regarded as adequate identification, for the 
words were at once written in spaces (1) and (3) respectively. The 
order in this case happened to be wrong; but when the same procedure 
was repeated for "truth" and "grade" (two R's, two T's) the order 
happened to be right. "Hutch" was subsequently identified as the 
fifth one (see note (2) above) so that the score was three "correct ". 
Observe that Elizabeth was guilty of the same kind of thing in Problem A- 
(5) Irrelevant information was sometimes introduced. For instance, 
Anne (L2) having established that "hutch" and "patch" are (3) and (5) 
attempted to find out which was which. She spent some time on 
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repetition of previously established information about the letters 
which were common and which therefore could not assist in the making 
of a distinction. This again might have been an attempt to check 
previous conclusions; but there is an attitude appropriate to the 
process of checking that was not observed here. When one checks 
one is on familiar ground, one has one's answers and has only to 
arrive at them afresh. But Anne was hesitant: 
.... E means C, so V means T Tt 
It seems likely that she not so much checking as searching around 
in an undirected fashion for a new point of departure. 
(6) Finally there were three instances of failure to notice contradic- 
tions or of failure to re- consider solutions when contradictions were 
observed. It is often difficult to be sure whether a contradiction 
has been noticed or not, but the case mentioned in the discussion 
of method (4) (p.85) provides a good example of an occasion when it 
is possible to be confident that the child was aware of contradiction 
but did nothing about it. 
William (Ll) gave the following answer: "Number (1) - 
find which letter is nearest R - P: CHote: He might 
equally well have said 'T' Then find the nearest 
one to N - L: Then A is near C, and E's near C, and G 
is nearest E. That's 'place'. Now take number (2): 
T - R - U - T - H [reading out slowly] Number (3): 
P - A - T - C - H Number (4): H - U - [Long pause. 
Finally he was asked: What has gone wrong here? But he 
did not reply and in the end continued...] - T - C - H. 
90. 
Number (5): G -R -A -D -E." 
It is plain that William forced himself to continue because he 
could not abandon the hypothesis which had seemed to work so far, and 
begin again. In order to conclude that (5) was "grade" he must have 
been very firm in forcing himself to ignore his doubts. It is possible 
that the intervention when he was solving number 4. made him feel he 
must "do" something, and brought him to the point of continuing when 
otherwise he would have given up. The fact remains that he ignored 
his doubts instead of reconsidering his conclusions. 
When he had finished he was asked why he had looked for letters 
near one another. He replied: "Because I just thought it would be 
that way." He was then asked: "Does it always have to be the same 
distance away ?" He hesitated, looked uncomfortable, and said: "It 
would be better." 
PROBLEM D. 
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We want to find out the ages of two girls 
called Jean and May. We know that a third girl, 
Betty, is 15, and that she is three years older 
than one of the two girls and five years older 
than the other. If we had one more piece of 
information we could calculate the ages of Jean 
and May. What is that piece of information? 
The question, as it stands, divides children sharply into two 
groups: those who appreciate the nature of this rather unusual 
problem, and those who do not. Some of the children failed to 
understand that they were not being asked to discover the ages 
of Jean and May but only to say what additional information would 
be necessary before this could be done. Children who understood 
what was required of them did not have much difficulty in producing 
an adequate solution, though they differed in the ease and 
confidence of their explanations. Thirteen acceptable solutions 
were received. 
Examples: 
Morag (K6): "You need to know which is the youngest of the two." 
Pat (K5): "If they put one of them ... I don't know ... if 
they said one girl was the older." 
Nancy (L3): "What girl she was three years older than." 
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Pat (M2): "We need to know which is which." 
When the problem had been considered each child was asked: 
If May is older than Jean, what are the ages of May and Jean? 
The solutions to this question are listed below, together with 
the numbers of children who gave them. 
(a) May 12, Jean 10: 12 children 
(b) May 10, Jean 12: 1 child, who 
corrected herself after being questioned. 
(c) May 20 (15 +5), Jean 12 (15 -3): 1 child 
(d) May 20 (15 +5), Jean 18 (15 +3): 2 children 
(e) May 12 (15 -3), Jean 7 (15- (3 +5)): 
(f) Nfay13 (15 -2), Jean 8 (15- (2 +5)) : 
1 child 
1 child 
(g) May either 12 or 10 (15 -3, or 15 -5) Jean 7 (15- (3 +5)): 1 child 
(h) May 5, Jean 1: 1 child 
Of the 12 children who gave the correct solution 9 had previously 
been successful in giving the missing information, while of the 8 
who calculated wrongly 4. had been successful in this. 
ERRORS IN THE CALCULATION. 
(1) Treatment of an asymmetrical relation as a symmetrical one 
seems to underlie solutions (c) and (d). It is as if the reasoning 
runs: Betty is 5 years older than May, so May is 5 years older 
than Betty, so May is 15 + 5 = 20. This was not made explicit by 
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any of the children who gave this solution, but one girl (Margaret - 
Nl) did suggest by the words in which she explained what information 
was missing that she was regarding the relationship as symmetrical. 
Her words were: 
"You'd need to know which one was three years older and which 
one five years older." She then calculated, quite consistently, 
that May would be 20 and Jean 18.1 
The third solution in the above list is an interesting example 
of inconsistency. The "5 - year" relation is treated as symmetrical, 
the "3 - year" one as asymmetrical. This may merely indicate 
that the child's conception of the relationship is poorly 
established and fluctuating; but it might possibly be a function of 
the order in which the names appear in the problem. That is, the 
child might establish some link bel.ween the first - mentioned age 
interval and the first -mentioned name. If then, before being 
told that May is older than Jean, he has associated Jean with the 
3 -year interval and cannot dissolve this association, he would have 
to reverse the 5-year interval in order to satisfy the requirement 
1. The problem was perhaps made more difficult by the fact that 
the children were told that May was older than Jean, yet they 
had to realise and remember that both girls were younger than 
Betty. Possibly if they had been told instead that Jean was 
younger than May they would have been more successful. Burt 
(J. MT. Ped., 1919, 5, 121 -127) reports results which accord 
with this suggestion. For instance, he finds that the problem: 
"C is smaller than B; and B is Gma1ler than A. Is A greater 
than C ?" is solved by more children when the question is 
changed to read: "Is C smaller than A ?" It is, of course, ease 
of transition from one of these formulations to the other which 
constitutes full awareness of asymmetry. (See final discussion, 
p. 12 9) 
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that May is older. (See also note (2) below. It is just possible 
that solution (c) is an avoidance of the inclusion of one period 
within the other by the device of putting one above and one below 
the age to which they must both be related.). 
Ian (KL) showed that the order in which the names appeared was 
of some consequence to him. When he was presented with the first 
part of the problem he managed finally to say that it would be 
necessary to know which girl was the older; but he then went on 
promptly to advance a theory as to which one would be the older, 
thus: 
"I think Jean is 12 because she comes first. When my aunt 
talks about my two cousins she says the older one first." 
This appeal to ordinary experience at once makes the problem 
a "real- life" one, and indicates the difficulty which many of the 
children found in answering questions by way of deduction from the 
"given ". This will be particularly noticeable in some of the 
answers to logical problems to be discussed later. Few children 
were able to look on these as intellectual exercises. Nothing 
can be said at present about the significance of ability or 
inability to do this at this age; but the distinction may possibly 
be an important one. 
(2)' The second source of error in calculation was the failure to 
appreciate the overlap of the two age intervals: the fact that 
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the 3-year one is included within the 5 -year one. This 
failure may alternatively be described as "exclusion ". Solutions 
(e), (f), (g), (h) and perhaps (c) (see note (1)) seem to 
involve this error. It is seen in most pure and obvious form in 
(e). The girl who gave solution (f) attempted the division of 
5 into 2 and 3, but this only led her further astray because it 
apparently caused her to allocate the 2 -year interval wrongly, 
making May 2 years younger than Betty instead of 3 years younger, 
and in spite of this attempt at division she subtracted the entire 
5 -year interval from May's age to find Jean's. 
Solutions (g) and (h) are puzzling. When Margart (N3), 
who gave solution (g), was asked to explain why she had concluded 
that May would be either 12 or 10 she said: "She'd be either 
5 years or 3 years older than Jean." It would appear that she had 
calculated the age of the youngest child first by subtracting the 
combined intervals, 3 + 5, from the age of the eldest; and that 
then instead of finding the age of the middle girl by subtraction 
of 3 from the age of the eldest (that is, by straightforward 
application of a piece of given information) she had attempted to 
proceed upwards from Jean's age and did not know how the eight 
years should be divided. 
Solution (h) was reached by an extraordinary argument, too 
long to reproduce, in which repeated deducting of 3 and 5 took 
place. 
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(3) One girl began by asserting that there was no other information 
needed to solve the problem. She was then asked: "How old is 
May, then ?" - to which she replied: "She's 12 (How do you 
know she is not 10 ?) Oh: You would have to know which is 3 
years younger and which 5. (Suppose you knew May was older than 
Jean?) Then May would be 12 and Jean would be 10." 
This answer is of some importance. This girl had the actual 
calculation well under control, but she did not seem to realise 
that May and Jean could not be allocated to the two ages without 
some further piece of information. Her surprise when asked "How 
do you know she is not 10 ?" seemed completely genuine. 
It is particularly interesting tocbserve that the girl is 
Elizabeth (M5), whose answers were quoted in the discussion of 
abandonment of reasoning in problems A and C. 
Her apparent complete disregard for the entire problem of 
"which is which" in the instance just described suggests strongly 
that this Lype of error is not always a simple matter of conscious 
"guessing" or unwillingness to persevere, as it might have seemed 
from previous examples. On the other hand it is certainly some- 
times true that a child making an unsubstantiated choice knows 
very well that it is unsubstantiated and will admit it if pressed. 
The main distinction that is here suggested is between those instances 
when the child is aware that he could not defend his choice and 
those when he is not, but it is possible that there may also be 
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a distinction to be made between instances where some positive but 
unconscious principle is at work and those where no principle at 
all is operating. 
Further examples of this same tendency will be given later. 
PROBLEM J: 
98. 
Tom, Dick and Harry are three boys. Dick, 
who is 5 feet 4 inches tall, is 6 inches taller 
than one of the other boys, and 2 inches taller than 
the remaining one. Harry is taller than Tom. 
Therefore: 
(1) Tam is 5 ft. 2 ins, tall. 
(2) Harry is 4. ft. 10 ins, tall. 
(3) Harry is 5 ft. 0 ins, tall. 
(4) Tom is 4 ft. 10 ins. tall. 
(5) Harry is 5 ft. 2 ins. tall. 
This problem was given to the children in the order indicated 
by the alphabetical sequence. It is discussed here because it 
closely resembles Problem D from the point in that problem where 
the child is informed that May is older than Jean and is asked to 
calculate the ages accordingly. In this case, however, the 
problem is in "multiple- choice" form: that is, a set of "solutions" 
is provided, from which two are to be chosen. 
Eight children chose the correct solutions. Of the eight, 
Lwo had made errors which they corrected. 
Notes on Errors 
(1) Treatment of an asymmetrical relation as a symmetrical one 
occurs very much as in D. (See Problem D - error (1),) Here is 
a particularly good example: 
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Nancy (L3): "Find one [i.e. a solution you could take 6 inches 
off and get 5' 4 ". That would be 5' 10" - but it's not there! 
[There was such evident distress at this discovery that I 
suggested she stop looking at the choices and try afresh to 
calculate the solution] 
Well, Harry is taller than Tom, so Harry is the one Dick is 
6 inches taller than, so Harry is 1'10 ". Then Tom would be 
5' 2"." 
In this second attempt the asymmetry of the Dick:Harry 
relationship is recognised, but the Barry:Tom relationship is 
still being treated as symmetrical. "Harry is taller than Tom" 
is not recognised as meaning that Tom is smaller than Harry. It 
is almost as if "taller than Tom" is taken to mean "further away 
from Dick." 
Another possible interpretation would be that "taller" is 
being regarded not as a relation but as a quality which Harry 
possesses to a greater degree than Tom, so that the "6 inches" 
must refer to the former and the "2 inches" to the latter. But 
since the problem clearly could not be attempted at all unless its 
relational nature were in some way comprehended it would seem more 
likely that the error is to be taken as a sign of inability to 
manipulate the particular sort of relationship that is involved. 
(2) Again, as in D, there were several instances of difficulty with 
the 'overlap' - that is, the inclusion of ane interval within the 
other. 
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Rita (Llf): "So Tom is smallest - that's 4' 10" ... 2 inches 
smaller than the remaining one ... that's 4' 8 ". I must be 
wrong somewhere." 
But Rita was quite unable to see where she was wrong. 
Finally she chose one solution - number (3) - but could not justify 
it. 
Some children were successful in establishing the sequence: 
Dick - Harry - Tom, and appreciated that the gap between Dick and 
Tom was 6 inches. They then decided that Harry was 2 inches taller 
than Tom instead of realising that he must be 2 inches smaller than 
Dick. This resembles the answer given by one girl - Margaret (N3) - 
to problem D, and discussed on page 95. That this particular error 
is more common in J (occurring four times) is perhaps a function of 
the fact that the biggest interval is stated first. This may 
encourage calculation of the smallest height first, and an attempt 
to derive the middle height from the smallest rather than from the 
tallest. The grammatical subject of the sentence has, of course, 
been quite lost from sight when this occurs. It is interesting to 
consider what might be the effect of a change in the statement of 
the problem so that two short sentences were used and the subject 
"Dick" was repeated. 
(3) Abandonment of reasoning in the form of disregard of the 
"which is which" problem also occurs again no less than four times, 
but Elizabeth (M5) seems to have learned from Problem D. Here is 
her reply to J: 
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"Tom is 4' 10" (Why ?) Well 6" off 5'4" is t,.' 10" and Harry 
is taller than Tom - so Tom must be less than Harry. [Pause] 
Harry is 5' 2 "." 
On the other hand, Irene (K2) proceeds very much as she did in 
answering problem A. 
"One of the boys is 4' 10" and the other 5' 2". So I think 
Tom is 5' 2" and Harry is 4' 10"." 
It would be perfectly possible to regard this type of error 
as a case of ignoring information, for it does, of course, involve 
the ignoring of the statement that Harry is taller than Tom. 
But its distinguishing characteristic is the willingness to proceed 
directly to a conclusion. The question: which is which? does 
not seem to be asked at all. 
Here is a case, though, where there is doubt and searching. 
Carole (K3) : "Take 6 from 5' Y' - that's 4.' 10 ". Two 
inches taller than the remaining one. I'm near it, but I 
can't get it. One's 5' 4" and the other's 4' 10 ". Dick 
is 5' 1+ ", Tom is 4' 10 ", so Harry is 5' 2" (How do you know it's 
not Harry who is 4' 10 " ?) I don't know, really - I'm just 
guessing. (You are told how you can find out) She re -read 
the question.] Oh! If Harry is taller than Tom he is 5' 2 ". 
It is possible, of course, that though Carole said she was 
"just guessing" she had seen the reasoning at some earlier point 
in her thinking and then lost it but retained the conclusion. 
However at the point of final choice she was certainly aware of 
inability to defend it. 
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(4) This problem provided only one clear example of loss of hold an 
reasoning. Anne (L2), having concluded that Tom was 4' 10 ", was 
talking a few seconds later of Harry's height as being 4.' 10 ", and 
going on to deduce that Tam was 4' 8 ". 
(5) The "multiple- choice solutions" provided much opportunity 
for acceptance of contrary; ction, and there were further instances 
of the inability to reject one's own solutions even when contra- 
dictions were observed (cf. A(6) and C(6)). 
Pat (M2) : "If Harry is taller than Tom, Tom can't be 5' 2" 
tall - so number (1) is wrong. 'Harry is 4.' 10 "'is right. 
Number (3) is wrong. 'Tom is ..: (What's the matter ?) 
Tam can't both be same, so that means number 
(5) is right, because it is the only one left. [She showed 
no sign of recognition of the impossibility of Harry's being 
two heights at one and the same time, and seemed quite 
prepared to give (2) and (5) as her answer. But I decided 
to press her, and asked: Is that true then l Well,if Dick 
is 5' l+" and he's tallest Harry must be 4' 10" and Tom must 
be 4' 8 ". [-Overlap] so there's only one of them right. 
So number (2) is true, but it's the only one." 
This girl had been told before beginning that two solutions 
were true, yet she would reject this instead of re- examining her 
own reasoning. 
An example of apparently unnoticed contrar7iction is: "Dick's 
tallest, Tom is smallest. So Harry is 6 inches less than Dick - 
that's 1+' 10" - and Tom is 5' 4" less 2" - 5' 2 "." This answer 
was given by Margaret (N1). 
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PROBLEM E: Detective- Inspector Nitwit is investigating 
a murder. He suspects that Joe Crook may be the 
guilty man. The body was discovered at 7 p.m., 
and Joe is able to prove that he had been at a 
friend's house from 5 p.m. until 7.30 p.m. 
Detective- Inspector Nitwit is satisfied with Joe's 
alibi. But what do we have to know before we can 
say whether he is justified in accepting it? 
Only three children saw the point of the problem immediately. 
The remaining seventeen began by saying that it would be necessary 
to know whether Joe had indeed been at his friend's house from 5 p.m. 
till 7.30 p.m. (Notice that this is in spite of the use of the word 
"prove" in the third sentence. This suggests that it might be very 
interesting to study the development of the concept of proof at 
this age.) Two of the seventeen went on quickly to realise what 
information was missing. The remaining fifteen did not do so 
until their attention had been drawn again to the third sentence and 
some needed still further help and encouragement. Carole (K3) 
observed at the end: 
"It just shows you don't read these things." 
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Four children had to have the meaning of "alibi" explained to them. 
The following answer is a good example of the common pattern. 
Ian (K1) : "If I was a detective I'd go to that man's house 
and see if he said the same as Joe. (If it was true that. 
Joe was at his friend's house from 5 till 7.30. would you 
know that Joe wasn't the murderer ?) Yes, if it was true you 
would know. (Look again at the third sentence.) Oh: I see 
it now This didn't mean he was murdered at 7 p.m. If I 
was a detective I'd get a doctor to tell me when he was murdered." 
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PROBLEM F: If all fast - moving animals were smaller than slower- 
moving ones, which of the following would be the largest? 
(cat / snail / horse / squirrel / elephant) 
PROBLEM G: If all rough cloth were thicker than smoother cloth, 
which of the following would be the thickest? 
(silk / blanket / sacking / nylon / velvet) 
PROBLEM H: If all light- coloured foodstuffs were sweeter than 
darker -coloured ones, which of the following would 
be the sweetest? 
(honey / treacle / jam / brown sugar / milk) 
PROBLEM I: If all small articles weighed less than larger ones, 
which of the following would be heaviest? 
(an alarm clock / an iron / a cushion / a teacup / 
a nail) 
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PROBLEMS F TO I: 
A problem of this sort demands the acceptance of a statement 
that two qualities, each varying continuously beLwen two extremes, 
are perfectly correlated. The correlation may be one that is 
found in some measure in reality, or there may in fact be no real 
relationship between the qualities concerned. 
In addition to acceptance of the statement, there must be 
recognition that of the two qualitative series one is, for purposes 
of solving the problem, independent and the other dependent; and 
further that it is necessary to arrange the alternative responses 
in series according to the independent quality in order to arrive at 
the correct solution. The independent quality is, of course, the 
one whose real possession is to determine possession of the other 
quality with which it is to be regarded as correlated. 
The final step is to select the appropriate extreme of the 
independent series. 
It is not, of course, suggested that this procedure is consciously 
in the minds of those solving the problems; but this analysis seems 
to make the errors which occur more readily understandable. The 
conscious formulation which most favours correct solution is 
probably something like: "Fast ones are small, so slow ones are big. 
That means 'find the biggest' equals 'find the slowest'." It is 
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certainly clear from the replies that it is particularly advantageous 
in these problems to begin by stating a definite objective: "Look 
for the roughest" etc.. 
The errors were of three main types. 
(1) There was, first, inability to accept the statement where it 
conflicted with knowledge of reality. In no case was this inability 
total. It was very noticeably more difficult to lay aside know- 
ledge of real size and weight than of real thickness and sweetness. 
For instance it was easier to imagine milk sweeter than honey than 
to imagine a cushion heavier than an iron or an alarm- clock. 
Here is an example: 
Ian (K1) Problem F: "dell elephant! (Why ?) 
Because it's slow and it's large, and if it was fast- moving 
it would be small like a snail." 
Here there is clearly an attempt to accept the relationship 
fast-moving/Small - but he chooses not the slowest animal, but one 
which is both slow and large. (The slowest of those which he 
classifies as large ?) To Problem I the same child answers: 
"An alarm- clock. (Why ?) Because it's largest. (Is it larger 
than a cushion ?) No, it isn't - no, 'cushion' is the answer. 
(Why did you choose alarm- clock ?) I just thought in my mind: 
An alarm -clock would weigh heavier than a cushion." 
Yet Problems G and H he finds quite easy, saying: 
"Sacking, because it's rough and the roughest the thickest" 
and "Milk, because it's lightest ". 
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(2) The following practice was observed in three instances: 
first the alternative responses were divided quite arbitrarily 
into two groups according to real possession of either the 
dependent or the independent quality. One of these groups was 
then selected as lying towards the appropriate end of the series 
and a final selection was made from within this group according to 
real possession of the other quality. 
William (L1). Problem G: "Blanket, because blanket and 
sacking are rough, and the blanket is thicker than the 
sacking." 
This boy starts with the independent series and ends with the 
dependent ane. An example of the reverse procedure is given by 
Fay (M3) in Problem F: "Horse and elephant are larger, the 
others are smaller If a horse is faster than an elephant 
that makes it smaller, so the elephant's the largest." 
Errors of this type are evidently closely related to errors 
of the first kind because ordering in terms of the dependent series 
is in effect a failure to lay aside knowledge of reality; but they 
seemed sufficiently distinctive and noteworthy to merit separate 
classification. The practice of arbitrary grouping suggests that 
the notion of a continuous series between extremes may still be 
imperfectly developed so that things must be either "big" or "small" 
absolutely. 
(3) Choice of the appropriate extreme often gave trouble, 
particularly when the statement of the problem contained a reversal, 
that is,when both extremes of the dependent series were mentioned. 
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Thus: "If small articles weighed less .... find the heaviest." 
In these circumstances some children looked for the smallest 
article. 
Morag (K6) Problem I: "A nail, because it's smallest." 
But some children looked for the wrong extreme even when there 
was no reversal in the problem. 
Pat (N2) Problem H: "Light- coloured sweeter than darker - 
got to find darkest. It's not jam or brown sugar ... No' 
We must find lightest. Milk:" 
It will be recalled that during discussion of group test results 
it was stated that the zero score obtained by William (K7) an 
Group Test VIII (which corresponds to Problems F - I) was due to 
misinterpretation of test instructions. William scored zero 
because he underlined two of the possible solutions to group test 
questions, instead of one. 
During interview he was asked why he had done so. Be replied: 
"Because it said: 'Which would be the largest ?' and so on, and 
'largest'is plural." He appeared to have the idea that if only 
one choice had been required the form "larger" would have been used. 
Be had all four interview problems of this sort correct. 
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PROBLEM K: My brother has one brother. 
He has no sisters. 
Therefore: (1) He is sometimes lonely. 
(2 He is rather shy. 
3) I am a girl. 
¿5) 
I 
) I have two brothers. 
am a boy. 
The first two distractors in this problem may be described as "common- 
sense" distractors. They are in the nature of remarks which might be 
added casually and conversationally to the statements that form the 
premisses. There is no logical link, not even a faulty one. In 
the syllogistic problems that follow, distractors are generally divided 
into two groups: "common- sense" and "logical fallacy" distractors. 
It was considered that it might be of value to observe which of these 
would prove more attractive to children who failed to find the correct 
solution. 
In this case the "common- sense" ones notably failed to distract. 
Nine children gave the correct solution, ten chose response (4.) and 
the remaining boy said both (4.) and the correct solution were "right ". 
The only distractor apart from (4.) which even gave rise to hesitation 
was number (i). 
Here are a few examples of reasons given in support of the choice 
of. number (0: 
Douglas (K4.): "I have two brothers: That means this one 
[pointing to the words lone brother' in the premiss] must 
be my brother too." 
Rita (L): "I have two brothers. (Why ?) Well, if my 
brother has one brother I must have two." 
fa_C5.21: "Number (4) (Why ?) Because it's a brother that's 
speaking and his brother has one brother - so that's two." 
Margaret (N3): "Number (4.) (Why ?) Because if you have one 
brother and then another you have two." 
Reasons for choosing (5) generally took the form of explanation 
why (1) to (4.) had been rejected. Some reasons for rejecting 
(4) were: 
William (L1): "That wouldn't do because one brother would be me." - 
Jeanette (M1): "He has only one brother, so I must be his only 
brother." 
Linda (M4): "You can't have two brothers if there's only two of 
you." 
Ian (N4.): "Weil it's me that's talking, and I'm my brother's 
brother, so I can't have two brothers." 
Reasons given for rejecting (1) and (2) often showed that these 
did not seem to the children wholly irrelevant, though they were never 
considered satisfactory. 
Ian (K1) : "Well, he can't be lonely with another brother." 
Linda (M4.): "He won't be lonely or shy if he has a brother." 
No one showed any sign of amusement or scorn in considering these 
distractors. Qne reason for choosing (5) is interesting because of 
the personal "real -life" reference it contains. 
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William (K7): "'I am a boy' is right, for my wee brother has 
one brother, and I am the brother." 
The choice of distractor (.) might be regarded as an instance of 
failure to recognise symmetry of relationship, but perhaps it is 
rather to be seen as yet another instance of "exclusion ". The "I" 
is regarded as standing outside, separate. 
Comparison with Problem J is possible. There, when exclusion 
occurs, the schema seems to be: B - 3 - 5, 
instead of : (B - 3 ) 
((B -5 
Here the schema seems to be: Nye --p my brother - his brother 
instead of: Me -> my brother 
II H 
His brother E- my brother 
It is as if the schema stretches out in one direction, instead of 




If all people who were born in July 
were lazy, and Bob was lazy, Then: 
(1) We would know Bob had been born in July. 
(2) Bob's teacher would tell him to try 
harder. 
(3) We would not know that Bob had been 
born in July. 
(4) Bob would not want to tell anyone 
when his birthday was. 
(5) Bob might learn to work harder. 
PROBLEM M: 
If all boys with red hair played 
football well, and Tomngy did not 
have red hair, Then: 
(1) Tommy would not play football well. 
(2) Tommy might still play football well. 
(3) Tommy would have no hope of playing 
in the school team. 
(4) Tommy would probably play other games. 
(5) Tommy would wish his hair was red. 
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PROBLEMS L AND M. 
These two problems are very similar. Each is an attempt to test 
the ability to make a logical inference without the support of any 
experiential confirmation. In both cases the major premiss is not 
in fact true; so the child's knowledge of the real state of affairs 
cannot be mistaken for genuine deduction. The premisses are in the 
form "If..." It seemed probable that this would help the children 
to realise their hypothetical nature. 
In both cases one distractor is an expression of the logical 
fallacy of the "undistributed middle ": the child is tempted to accept 
as valid the simple conversion of the major premiss ignoring the 
fact that the predicate is undistributed. The correct solution 
offered is simply a denial of the fallacious conclusion reached in 
this manner. 
Although they differ a little, all other choices will be 
referred to as "common -sense distractors" (see page 110). In 
both problems one of them is no more than a very general cowwent on 
the situation ((5) in L and (4) in M) . Distractors (2) 
and (4) in L, and (5) in M - though also in the nature of comment - 
may be considered to involve the acceptance as premiss of some 
further proposition that the children take for granted. For instance, 
(2) in L may be said to rest on acceptance of a proposition to the 
effect that: "All teachers are people who tell lazy boys to work 
harder." And, of course, L (2) virtually ignores the stated 
major premiss. Finally, in M, distractor (3) does depend on 
acceptance of the logical fallacy but it is worded in a "common- sense" 
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fashion. Children who are really deducing logically but 
fallaciously are hardly likely to prefer it to distractor (1). 
(In fact though (3) was sometimes declared to be "true" it was 
never finally offered as a solution.) Ten children chose the 
logical fallacy distractor for both items. Seven chose the 
logical fallacy for one problem and a common -sense distractor for 
the other. One child chose common -sense distractors for both. 
Two chose the correct solution for one problem and the logical 
fallacy for the other. Also three of the children who chose 
wrong solutions showed some sign of recognition of the correct 
solution in Problem M. 
The most common reason given for choice of the logical 
fallacy was that it was obvious. Sometimes premisses were simply 
read aloud, along with the "conclusion" as if that spoke for 
itself and there was nothing more to be said. Sometimes, however, 
reasons for rejection of the other four possibilities were given. 
Examples of those are: 
Problem L, distractor (2). 
William (K7): "His teacher would know his birthday and 
wouldn't bother to tell him to work harder." 
Margaret (N3): "Because it's a different subject. It's 
about Bob's teacher and we were talking about Bob." 
Problem L, distractor (4). 
William (K7) : "Everyone would know when his birthday was 
anyway." 
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Problem M, distractor (3). 
Linda (M4): "Number (3) might do - but I think (1) is better 
(Why ?) Because even if you can play well you still don't 
always get in the school team." [Therefore he might have 
no hope of playing in it even if his hair were red, therefore 
his having no hope is not a consequence of his hair colour?" 
Problem M, distractor (5). 
Margaret (N1): "It doesn't say he would want his hair red." 
Linda's rejection of distractor (3) in Problem M is interesting 
as an objection to the implied logical sequence. Margaret's 
rejection of L (2) is an example of insistence on relevance - an 
insistence that was by no means rare. Several of the children 
seemed to be searching, somewhat gropingly, for criteria of 
relevance. 
Reasons for accepting common -sense distractors are also 
interesting. Irene (K2) chose M(5) because "(3) is true as well 
and if he would have no hope of playing in the school team he would 
be sure to wish his hair was red ". She appeared to be endeavouring 
to incorporate both choices in one 
Another reason was: "I'll take (5) - because I would wish my 
hair was red." This was given by Douglas (K4).1 
1. A number of investigators have studied the influence on the 
ability to make logical inferences of attitudes towards 
conclusions. See I. L. Janis and F. Frick: J. Exp. Psych., 
1943, 33, 73 -77; A. Lefford: J. Genl. Psychol., 1946, 34, 
127 -151; J.J.B. Morgan and J.T. Morton: J. Soc. Psychol., 
1944, 20, 39-59; D. Thistlethwaite: J. Abnor. Soc. Psychol., 
1950, 45, 442 -4-58. 
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It was fairly common to find a child willing to accept as true 
all four distractors and rejecting only the correct solution, and 
sometimes in such cases there was considerable hesitation before a 
final choice was made. As already stated, only five children showed 
any interest in the correct solution at all - and in every case this 
occurred only in relation to Problem M. Whether Problem M 
is easier in some way or whether this is a practice effect it is 
impossible to say from the evidence available. These five answers to 
M are quoted in full. 
Morag (K6): "I think the second one. (Why ?) Because maybe 
it isn't that all boys ... maybe some other boys that didn't have 
red hair could play football too." 
Pat (K5): "Then Tommy would wish his hair was red ... Well, 
the first one could be, too, in a way. And the second one 
could be too. [No apparent recognition of contradiction 
Even though he didn't have red hair he might still play 
football well." 
Pat did not really know which of these to choose. She took 
(5) eventually - probably because of inability to decide between 
(1) and (2) . 
Fay (N3) : "The first one. (Why ?) Because ... [re- reading 
premisses] But number (2) might be - because maybe the boys 
without red hair could still play football well. (Why did you 
choose (1) then ?) Because ..." [re- reading premisses] 
Margaret (N3): "Tommy might still play football well. (Why ?) 
It doesn't tell you all the boys that hadn't red hair didn't 
play football well. I thought of (1) then saw it was wrong." 
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Rita (14): "Number (1) (Why ?) Well, it might be (2) - but if 
he didn't have red hair you would take for granted after that 
first statement that he didn't play it well. Yet he might 
still play it well. I think number (1), though. Is it just 
according to the statement? (Yes) I think (1), then." 
The last of these is perhaps particularly significant. This girl 
is concerned about what may be called the genuineness of the 
argument. She does not see the point of making the first state- 
ment about the relationship between having red hair and playing 
football, and following this up by the statement about Tommy, unless 
the conclusion excludes Tommy from the group of boys who play 
football well. "Might still..." seems to her a feeble conclusion - 
as indeed in a sense it is. She has not yet reached the stage when 
her appreciation of strict logical development is stronger than her 
need to'see the purpose of the arguunent. She is not able to regard 
this as an intellectual exercise. Her attitude is akin to that of 
insistence on relevance - as the child sees "relevance ". 
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PROBLEM N: 
NO ANIMALS THAT CAN ONLY MOVE 
SLOWLY CAN CLIMB TREES. 
A HEDGEHOG IS A PRIChLY ANIMAL. 
ALL PRICLY ANIMALS CAN ONLY 
MOVE SLOWLY. 
Therefore: 
(1) All animals that can only 
move slowly are prickly. 
(2) A hedgehog has no need to 
climb trees because it 




(3) All ani m&1 s that can move 
quickly can climb trees. 
(2f) A hedgehog can move quite 
fast sometimes. 
(5) No hedgehogs can climb trees. 
Problem N is a piece of deduction of a more elaborate nature 
.than either L or M. The premisses are not presented in an order 
which leads readily to the conclusion and they are not stated in 
hypothetical or conditional form, a fact which might be expected to 
make the common -sense distractors more powerfully alluring than in the 
two preceding problems, and which did indeed appear to have this effect. 
Distractors (2) and (4) belong very clearly to the common -sense 
class. Distractors (1) and (3) are logical fallacies. 
The correct solution does accord with real experience - to the 
best óf the writer's belief: - and so it is very important to try to 
ascertain whether it is or is not reached deductively. Indeed, on 
the whole this problem departs from experience much less obviously than 
do L and M,and common -sense reasons were frequently given for acceptance 
and rejection of all distractors and of the correct solution. Nine 
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children chose common -sense distractors (eight - distractor (2); 
one - distractor (1+)), four chose logical fallacies; seven chose the 
correct solution. But full genuine deduction seemed to occur in only 
three cases. 
Here are a few quotations: - 
Ian (Ki): "It can't be (3) because a lion moves fast but 
it can't climb trees." 
Linda (M4): "It might be (5). (Why ?) Because they're 
fat and they have small feet and couldn't cling to trees. 
Or maybe (L), because no one has real proof they don't move 
fast sometimes." 
Pat (U): "Well, it's not (1), because a snail moves slowly 
and it's not prickly." 
Many of the children were obviously quite satisfied with reasons 
of this kind. Some, however, seemed to be aware that they should be 
deducing - or "imagining it out of this" as one boy put it - even when 
they did not succeed in doing so. Thus: 
Douglas (K4) : "I think (5) is the most sensible. (Why ?) 
Well, they can't really. But if you're imagining it out of 
this [pointing to premisses] I'd say (1). (Why ?) Well, 
the hedgehog is very slow and it is prickly." 
Elizabeth (M5): [Long pause] "Number (1). (Why ?) 
Well, animals that can move slowly can't climb trees. 
(Why does it follow from this ?) Well, a hedgehog is a 
prickly animal. [Pause] It might be number (4), because 
you need to be quite fast to climb a tree." 
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A few children gave quite explicit accounts of the fallacious 
reasoning which led them to choose (1) or (3). 
Pat (M2): "Number (3). My ?) If all animals that move 
slowly can't climb trees, then animals that move quickly 
can." 
This would appear to be a very clear illustration of the kind 
of tendency which has already been referred to several times as "exclusion ", 
or failure to deal with overlap. Here it is failure to take account 
of the possibility of overlap. S and P are seen as co- extensive not 
as possibly only partly so. The notion that S may lie wholly within 
some larger P is not considered. 
Relevance was again sometimes taken as a criterion for acceptance 
or rejection of solutions. 
Margaret (Nl): "Number (2) won't do. It doesn't say anything 
about a hedgehog wanting to climb trees." 
Pat (N2): "Number (3) - that's it, I think. But (5) is right 
as well. It tells you. [She then re -read premisses in order 
(1), (3), (2)] (Nhich do you choose, then - (3) or (5) ?) 
It's (5). (YVhy ?) Because it's not talking about the other 
animals, it's talking about the hedgehog." 
This last is interesting, because the girl has apparently deduced 
the right solution yet is also willing to accept one of the fallacies. 
Her final reason for choice is also interesting. Does she in some way 
appreciate that "prickly animals" and "slow- moving animals" are middle 
terms and that the conclusion should be making a link between hedgehogs 
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and the ability to climb trees? 
Finally here are two answers in full. The first is an example 
of perfect and unhesitating deduction (from a girl who was also 
correct in Problem M); the second is a good instance of self - 
correction, from a boy who, though very good at most of the problems, 
accepted logical fallacies confidently in L and M. 
Margaret (N3): "Number (5). (Why ?) Because it says 
'No animals ' [reading first premiss] That means 
animals that move slowly can't climb trees, and it says prickly 
animals move slowly and the hedgehog is a prickly animal, so 
it can't climb trees." 
Ian (N4) : "Number (1), I think. (2) and (4) have nothing to 
do with it at all, so they're out [scornful tone] (3) could 
be true. [Re -reads premisses carefully] 
I'm not so sure about (1) now. It just tells you .... well, 
there's more animals than prickly ones that can move slowly. 
I think it's (5) now. (Why ?) Well, slow animals can't climb 
trees, and a hedgehog is a slow animal. (How do you know ?) 
Because all prickly animals can only move slowly." 
The scornful tone in which the common -sense distractors are 
dismissed is worthy of note. This was the only sign of such 
scorn. 
Comparison of L and M with N reveals that almost all the children 
who chose common -sense distractors in L or M do so also in N. But 
some of those who kept strictly to logical fallacies in L and M 
succumb to the temptation of distractor (2) in N; and this is even 
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true of Morag (K6) who chose a logical fallacy in L and the correct 
answer in M. Without follow -up we are not, of course, in a 
position to say what is the predictive significance of the choice 
of one kind of distractor rather than another at this stage. This 
is a question that it would probably be very profitable to investigate. 
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PROBLEM 0: 
IF BIRDS COULD SWIM BUT COULDN'T Then: 
FLY, AND ANIMALS COULD FLY BUT 
(1) A cat might catch a bird COULDN'T SWIM, AND FISH COULD DC 
under water. BOTH 
(2) A shark might catch a pig in 
the air. 
(3) A cat would probably be able to 
swim faster than a mouse. 
(14.) A trout would probably be able 
to swim faster than a puppy. 
(5) It would not be possible for 
a cat to catch a fish. 
This problem proved to be less fruitful than most. Thirteen 
of the children could solve it fairly easily. There was an occasional 
common -sense reason for rejection of a distractor - for example: 
Ian (K1): "I think (1-) isn't true. If a puppy was always kept 
in the water it would be more used to it." 
William (L1): "It's not (1) or (2), because a cat or bird 
wouldn't go underwater and a pig wouldn't be in the air." 
The second of these examples is rejection of the whole "make - 
believe" while the first is not; but neither is drawn from the 
premisses in any way. 
One or two interesting reasons for acceptance of distractors were 
offered. Two children - Douglas (K4) and Morag (K6) - thought (1+) 
could be considered true because'k puppy couldn't swim at all ": 
Occasionally distractors were accepted because of partial and 
inadequate application of premisses, e.g. 
"Number (1) could be true, for a bird could swim." 
And sometimes of course the premisses were quite confused, though this 
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was rarer than might have been expected. 
Distractor (5) gave some difficulty because of the negative 
involved. Two children were tricked by it into acceptance of (5), 
and one or two saved themselves just in time. 
For example, Carole (K3) says: 
"Number (5) - that's right: If a fish was in the air at 
the same time it would be possible, so it's this. one." 
Once more a few children were prepared to accept several of the state- 
ments as true. The decision then seemed largely fortuitous. There 
was little chance for considerations of relevance to operate here - 
though one girl insisted that the right solution "went better" than 
(3) or (5), which she also accepted as true. 
Only one girl began by stating the premisses more concisely, thus: 
"Animals fly, fish do both, birds swim." 




DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
In such a study as this it is impossible strictly to separate 
the statement of results and the discussion of them, and much that 
belongs under the heading of discussion is already contained in the 
preceding pages. The function of the final section must therefore 
be to draw together these earlier scattered discussions and 
summarise the conclusions and questions that emerge from the work as 
a whole. This purpose can perhaps best be served by a consideration 
of the errors that were found to recur most frequently in a variety 
of problems; and by an attempt to relate findings to the opinion 
expressed in Chapter III that the study of errors may be of direct 
service in the development of intelligence testing in three main 
ways. 
The main recurrent errors were: 
(1) Rigid separation of the "components" of a problem in 
such a way that no allowance is made for the possibility 
of overlap or inclusion of one within the other. 
(2) Failure to handle asymmetrical relationships 
successfully and with understanding of the equivalence of 
different statements. 
(3) Abandonment of reasoning at a point in a problem 
where there are two possibilities,1 one of which must be 
rejected. This might be (a) more or less conscious; or 
(b) apparently unaccompanied by any awareness of an 
inadequacy of reasoning. 
1. Notice that this was never observed to occur when more than 
two possibilities were open. 
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(1) Failure to reconsider a conclusion once reached, even 
if it led to evident contradiction. 
The first two of these errors are of much interest in relation 
to Piaget's theories about the development of intelligence. In 
"La Psychologie de l'Intelligence" he describes an experiment 
conducted with six -year -old children. Twenty beads are placed in 
a box. All are made of wood. Most of them are brown, a few are 
white. With the beads in full view the child is asked: Are there more 
wooden ones or more brown ones? According to Piaget a child under 
seven will almost always reply that there are more brown ones "because 
there are only two or three white ones." He is then asked: Are 
the brown ones wooden? - Yes - If I take away all the wooden beads, 
will any beads be left. - No. - If I take away all the brown ones will 
any be left? - Yes, the white ones. Thenthe original question is 
repeated and the child still affirms that there are more brown beads 
than wooden ones. 
The child who gives this reply is evidently unable to appreciate 
the inclusion of the class of brown beads within the class of wooden 
beads. Piaget's explanation is that he can focus his attention on the 
whole class (wooden beads) or on the two parts (brown beads and white 
beads), but that when he focusses on the parts he destroys the whole 
by that very action. This Piaget ascribes to a lack of mobility in 
the successive f ocussings. 
The children in the present study are of course much older than 
those who were the subjects of this experiment of Piaget's. But 
Piaget's theory is that in general the same difficulties encountered 
in dealing with objects at the age of 6 or 7 recur at 11 or 12 when 
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words are substituted for objects. It is therefore interesting to see 
how his theory applies to the instances of "exclusion" or difficulty 
with overlap which were observed in this investigation. 
Errors which seemed to be in some way connected with overlap 
difficulty occurred in Problems B, D, J, F to I, K, L, M and N. 
In Problem B, there was trouble with overlapping series such as 
"AB, BC, CD " In D and J there was failure to recognise the 
inclusion of one interval of age or height within another. In F to I 
there was a tendency to arbitrary division into groups which suggested 
that the notion of a continuous series was not fully developed. (It 
is perhaps not obvious that this is an error of the same sort as the 
others, but there are grounds for suspecting that it is closely 
connected. There is the same rigidity of separation of components.) 
In K there was failure to recognise the "I" as one of the group of 
brothers. In L, M and N, choice of a logical fallacy distractor 
amounted to failure to recognise the possibility that one class 
might be wholly within some larger one. 
Common to these errors seems to be a tendency to see all things 
as self -contained, in such a way that if D belongs in the group "CD" 
it cannot at the same time belong in the group "DE "; the three -year 
interval cannot be part of the five-year one; an object must be either 
"big" or "small" and cannot at the same time be big in relation 
to certain objects and small in relation to others; "I" am not seen 
as "nay brother's brother "; and if all boys who have red hair are known 
to play football well then these two classes are co- extensive and it 
is inconceivable that some members of the class of boys who play 
football well should have brown hair. 
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The error, then, lies not in a failure to perceive inconsist- 
encies (which might have been expected) but rather in a failure to 
perceive consistencies. There is failure to recognise that given 
statements of relationship do not necessarily preclude all other 
statements of relationship involving the same objects 
If this is so,then the second recurrent error appears to have 
much in common with the first, for there thought is set in one 
posture in a very similar way. Considerable mental agility is 
necessary for the realisation that "Tom is older than James" and 
"James is younger than Tom" are statements of the same relationship, 
and it is precisely this agility, this ease of transition, which seems 
to be lacking. This agrees very closely with Piaget's findings. 
The third error in the list should perhaps really be regarded 
as two quite separate errors, because the distinction between more 
or less conscious guessing and real unawareness of any inadequacy in 
reasoning is probably a very important one. When there is real 
unawareness it is as if the child has no sense of "either A or B" as 
a statement of uncertainty that must be resolved by proof, but is 
regarding the "or" as implying that choice is appropriate and that he 
has powers of allocation. This last suggestion is offered very 
tentatively because it was considered as a possible interpretation 
only after the experimental work had been concluded and it has 
therefore not been tested in any way. But if it is correct, then 
the question raised in discussion of Problem E about the development 
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of the concept of proof at this age may have some bearing on this error; 
and there may also be some connection with the errors that consisted 
in choosing "common- sense" distractors in the syllogistic problems. 
On the other hand, when error (3) involves guessing that is 
recognised as such, there is this in common with error (4): it might 
be argued that neither is attributable to a failure of intellect in 
so strict a sense as are the other three. These two errors are due 
rather to a failure of effort and a willingness to be content with 
what is not regarded as satisfactory even in the moment of its 
acceptance. In some cases it seemed very much as though the inflexi- 
bility that showed itself in the clinging to a conclusion once reached 
was the of a fear that the 
beginning would prove impossible and of a conviction, no doubt un- 
considered, that it was better to hold on to a wrong solution than 
end by having no solution at all. 
Inflexibility of one sort or another is, then, a very general 
feature of these errors; but it would be incautious to assume that 
the inflexibility of error (4), which is a failure to act on perceived 
inconsistencies, has any connection with the failures to perceive 
consistencies that have previously been discussed. Indeed at the 
moment it looks very much as though they may have quite different 
sources and show no tendency to occur together. What they have in 
common to justify the application of a common term is that both, in 
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different ways, involve the fixing or "setting" of a first impression 
into immutability. 
The suggestions made in Chapter III will now be considered in 
turn in relation to the experimental findings. The first of these 
suggestions was that the study of errors might further the develop- 
ment of intelligence testing by increasing our understanding of the 
psychological relationships between different problems, and might 
throw doubt on the present practice of classifying items into "types" 
on the basis of obvious resemblances of form. 
Relevant to this are the results of an inquiry conducted by 
Sir Godfrey Thomson in one of the few attempts that have been made 
to study intelligence test problems one by one in their prognostic 
capacity. Sir Godfrey made a careful follow-up study of the 
individual items of a Moray House Test and he reports' that he found 
reason for suspicion that the "type" of a question was by no means a 
sure index of itsefficiency for selection purposes. Questions which 
looked very similar were found to differ greatly in the success with 
which they made the distinction between ability and inability to 
undertake a course of secondary school studies. 
Sir Godfrey was inclined to regard the difference between 
successful and unsuccessful items as one of "difficulty ", and this, 
1. G. H. Thomson: Following -up individual items in a group 
intelligence test. Brit. J. Psychol., 19112, 32, 310 -317. 
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in a sense, it no doubt is. But the findings of the present study 
make it seem clear that the reason why follow -up showed focinal type 
to be a poor index of prognostic value is that questions formally 
similar may differ very greatly in respect of the sorts of understand- 
ing and competence necessary for their solution,while those formally 
different may be in these respects closely akin. This study, 
although not yet related to any follow -up, shows repeatedly how 
questions that are, on superficial inspection, of the same type may 
in fact be solved incorrectly because of very cHfferent errors. 
Consider, as examples, the series AB, FG, KL... and the series 
AB, BC, CD... The first of these is particularly liable to provoke 
the error described as "miscounting" (see page 79 ) while the second 
demands competence in dealing with overlap (see page 79 and the 
preceding section of this discussion). The discovery of this 
¿;fference makes it evident that these two questions may be of very 
different prognostic value, and this even if "difficulty ", as 
measured by percentage correct, were found to be practically the same. 
On the other hand, there are some apparently widely differing 
problems in which very similar sorts of error commonly occur. There 
is no need to illustrate this here, since the main recurrent errors 
have already been discussed at length. But it is relevant to the 
present topic to point out that this fact not only casts serious 
doubt on our practice of classifying by formal type in deciding, say, 
in what proportions a test will be composed, but also explains why 
1. It is very easy to see how such a finding as this might seem to 
give support to the notion that it is not profitable .to spend time 
trying to justify the choice of test items on any basis other 
than that of follow-up. 
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the giving of different weight to different formal types of question 
has generally seemed to make so little difference in the end to 
distributions of total score. 
The second contribution to intelligence testing that we might 
look to the study of errors to make was said in Chapter III to be the 
augmenting of our ability to make direct inferences from final 
solutions to "underlying events ", the advantage to be derived being, 
of course, that we might then assess a child's mental powers on 
the evidence of his written answers with more precision and con- 
fidence than are possible to us in the present state of our know- 
ledge. This is a more ambitious suggestion than the first one; 
and the opinion that we can never make such inferences with perfect 
confidence has already been expressed. (See page 37 ) We 
may study five hundred children and find that in every case where a 
certain wrong solution is offered it seems to be due to the same 
defect in understanding. But we must recognise that it is never 
impossible for another child to come along and arrive at this same 
solution in a different way. 
This reservation made, however, the work so far done would seem 
to give some indication of what it might be possible to achieve. 
There are in fact two possibilities: to be content with 
classifying wrong solutions according to the errors which are 
found commonly to underlie them; or deliberately to construct 
questions so as to invite certain errors and render less probable the 
134.. 
occurrence of others. Now obviously if follow -up shows the occurrence 
of some kinds of error to be more significant than that of others, 
control of errors by deliberate question construction will be very 
desirable; for if the purpose of a question is to assess the child's 
freedom from or liability to a certain sort of error and he solves 
the question wrongly because of a different incompetence that purpose 
will not have been served. Ways of exercising this control are 
therefore important to consider; and the most obvious is by informed 
choice of exact wording and manner of presentation; though again 
there is a reservation to make, because it is of great importance to 
remember that children are active in the interpretation of problems, 
and however skilfully they are constructed we can never be sure that 
each child will be affected by variations in the same way. This, 
however, does not make it unimportant to have knowledge of the most 
common effects of certain sorts of change. To investigate these 
fully, numerous comparative studied would have to be undertaken; 
but the results of the present study provide some suggestions of the 
kind of difference which it might be important to consider. For 
instance, the premisses of Problems L and M were stated in hypothetical 
or conditional form, while those of Problem N were stated categorically, 
and it has already been suggested (page 119) that this may have had 
the effect of making the common -sense distractors in the latter 
problem particularly attractive. Again, in Problem A the possible 
importance of using names which readily form a set was mentioned (page 69); 
1. Burt (J. Exp. Ped,,1919, 5, 121 -127) considers the effects of changes 
in wording and finds them to be considerable. 
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and the significance of the wording of the negative statement "Tom has 
never been inside Central School" was considered on pages 72 and 73 
The footnote to page 93 has suggested that in Problem D the statement 
"Niay is older than Jean" may have, in its context, an effect different 
from that of the statement "Jean is younger than May "; just as, in 
Problem J, the substitution of "Tom is smaller than Harry" for "Harry 
is taller than Tom" might make errors of asymmetry less likely to 
occur by firmly associating Tom with the smaller end of the scale. 
Further, in both D and J, the effect of syntactical changes might be 
considerable. In each case the relationships on which the problem 
mainly depends are stated in a rather long and involved sentence. 
If two or even three sentences had been used to give the same 
information, so that there was less risk of losing sight of the 
grammatical subject, some of the overlap errors might not have 
occurred. This possibility was mentioned on page 100. 
There is, then, a strong case to be made for the study of the effects 
of quite small changes in the wording and the syntax of problems. 
But there is another possible way of controlling the occurrence of 
errors which would seem at first sight both easier and more likely 
to be effective, and that is by the use of the multiple- choice" 
form of question and the judicious selection of distractors. Thus 
it might be argued that in Problem J the inclusion of "Harry is 5ft. 10ins. 
tall" and "Tom is 5ft. bins. tall" as possible choices would make the 
problem more effective as a test of ability to handle asymmetrical 
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relationships than it is at present; and similarly that it would be 
possible to construct a set of distractors specially designed to invite 
errors involving inability to deal with overlap. Thus these 
different errors could be isolated and the extent of the child's 
liability to each of them could be separately assessed. There are, 
however, a number of important objections to this procedure. It has 
already been acknowledged that even though we discover that a given 
error leads almost infallibly to a given wrong solution we can never 
make a completely confident inference from the solution back to the 
error. We can do it much more confidently, though, if the solution 
has been freely produced by the child than if it has been chosen by 
him from a restricted list. There is evidence in the results that 
children are sometimes actually prevented by multiple- choice solutions 
from structuring a problem effectively at all. Instead, they work 
through the list accepting or rejecting the choices for reasons that 
are not always integrated with one another; and all manner of con- 
fusions and possibilities of contradiction may arise. The answer 
given by Pat, (M2) to Problem J, and quoted on page 102 is a good 
example of this and shows how, if one were to choose distractors 
with the object of inviting errors of overlap and asymmetry, the 
occurrence of muddles and contradictions could defeat this aim by 
becoming hopelessly interwoven with the errors at which the question 
was aimed. To put this in other words, multiple- choice solutions are 
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likely to fail to make important distinctions because of the existence 
of a group of errors which produce no characteristic wrong solutions, 
but may manif est themselves in an unlimited number of ways. 
It will be recalled that when the main recurrent errors were 
discussed there were found to be grounds for suggesting a distinction 
between errors (1), (2) and (3b) on the one hand and (3a) and (4) on 
the other (see page 130). This distinction is now relevant 
because it seems to correspond to some extent to the distinction 
between errors which lead regularly to a small number of predictable 
wrong solutions and those whose effects on the solution finally offered 
cannot be foreseen. Thus the effects of errors (1) and (2) can be 
anticipated quite readily once the error is known; but those of (3) 
and (4) are much harder to predict because of the manifold opportunities 
for reasoning to give rise to possibilities of contradiction or to 
points of decision between alternatives.' 
To attempt another and more general statement of the difference, 
it would appear that errors (1) and (2) are failures of reasoning; 
while errors (3) and (Lp) - or at least (3b) and (4) - are failures 
to reason. 
1. The status of (3a) is puzzling because it would seem to belong 
in this respect with (3b) and (.) rather than with (1) and (2), 
although in the previous discussion it was classed with the 
latter. But little is known about it and it is in many ways 
the most perplexing of the errors observed. 
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If one then considers the application of this distinction to the 
less frequently recurring1 errors it becomes clear that some - for 
instance, failure to use one's own solutions to solve later parts of 
a problem - are failures to reason; some - for instance, t-ifficulty 
with negative statements - are failures of reasoning; and some cannot 
readily be assigned to one class or the other. This a-ifficulty in 
classifying may arise because understanding of the errors is incomplete; 
but more probably it arises because the classification is not all - 
inclusive. That an important distinction exists does, however, seem 
clear; and, for the present, I propose to refer to errors that are 
failures of reasoning as "conceptual errors "; and to those that are 
failures to reason as "non- conceptual errors" in order to avoid 
premature assumptions regarding their nature and source. It is 
evident, then, that the making of inferences from wrong solutions to 
errors is rendered much more difficult by the existence of the non - 
conceptual errors, because they are much harder to test - and much 
harder to avoid testing. At the same time, the results of this 
study show that some problems - when attempted by children of this 
age and ability, it is important to add - are in fact much more free 
of them than others. At one extreme is Problem K where the only error 
that occurs is very clearly of a conceptual kind. At the other are 
Problems A and C, where non -conceptual errors abound. Indeed, in 
1. Frequency of recurrence is, of course, to some extent a function 
of the arbitrary choice of the interview problems. 
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these problems no error occurs that can confidently be classed as 
conceptual. It seems that the children have already passed beyond 
the stage of being in any doubt about the processes of identification 
by comparison on which solution depends; but in following the 
chains of reasoning that are involved they find very many opportuni- 
ties for errors of a non -conceptual kind. 
The question of whether it is possible to test the two sorts 
of error separately is, of course, unimportant in practice however it 
might be in theory, unless there are grounds for thinking it 
desirable. And the question of whether it is desirable leads directly 
to consideration of the third suggestion made in Chapter III: that 
the study of errors might contribute to resolution of the problem of 
providing theoretical justification for the inclusion in intelli- 
gence tests of some sorts of question rather than others. The way 
in which this contribution might be made was discussed on page 38 
and it is to the argument advanced there that reference must now be 
made. To recapitulate briefly, it was there suggested that the 
study of errors might help to reveal the existence of "critical 
points" in a developmental sequence; and that the recurrence of one 
error in a variety of different tasks might be taken as indicating 
the likelihood that a critical point had been found. We have now 
to ask, then, whether, in the main recurrent errors that were 
together responsible for so many of the wrong solutions offered, we 
have evidence of critical points of development which (providing 
14_0. 
always that follow -up brings verification of their critical nature) would 
provide a basis for the construction of test items for use at this age. 
As soon as the question is asked it becomes evident that the 
distinction between conceptual and non -conceptual errors iszelevant. 
The nature of the conceptual errors - so far as here observed - would seem 
to be fully compatible with the notion that they are the outcome of ways of 
mental functioning that hold a place in a regular sequence and give way 
in time to others more flexible and highly organised; and this is 
strongly supported by their agreement with Piaget's findings. But the 
position with regard to the non -conceptual errors is much less clear. If 
they, too, have their place in some developmental sequence then it is 
evidently a different one; and, although views about its characteristics 
must at present be in the nature of speculation, it would seem probable 
that its stages would be less well defined, its transitions less sharp, 
and that the possibilities of early cessation or slowing down of 
development - or even of regression - would be greater. 
The conclusion to which this argument leads, then, is that the 
differences between the failures of reasoning and the failures to reason are 
such that attempts should be made to assess their occurrence separately, for 
purposes both of prediction and of finding ways of helping children to over- 
come them. Whether we choose to call them both failures of intelligence 
or to reserve this name for the failures of reasoning alone is unimportant. 
What is important is that the existence of a distinction between them should 
be recognised, that the existence of similar distinctions involving other 
categories of error should be explored, and that further study should be 
directed to their nature and significance. 
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The Group Tests 
Each test was prefaced by the following instructions, which 
are those regularly used in the Moray House Tests. 
Read the following carefully: - 
1. When you are told to begin, answer the questions as 
quickly and as carefully as you can. 
2. Begin at the beginning and go straight through. 
3. If after trying a question you find you cannot answer 
it, don't lose time but go on to the next. 
4.. When you finish one page, go on to the next. 
5. You may do any rough working at the side of the page 
if you wish. 
6. Make any alterations in your answers clearly. 
7. Ask no questions at all. 
Test I. (Alphabet). 
The alphabet is printed here to help you with some of the questions. 
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z 
Write your answers to these questions in the brackets. 
1. If the letters of the alphabet from B to F were written in the 
opposite order beginning with F, which letter would remain 
in the same place as before? ( ) 
2. Which letter is as many letters after K in the alphabet as 
C is after A? ( ) 
3. Which letter comes between 0 and T in the alphabet but is 
not next to Q? ( ) 
1+. If the letters of the alphabet from M to S were written in the 
opposite order, beginning with S, which letter would remain 
in the same place as before? ( ) 
5. If the letters in the word SPECIAL were rearranged so as to 
be in alphabetical order, which letter would then be in 
the middle? ( ) 
6. Which letter in the word RESUMPTION occurs latest in the 
alphabet? ( ) 
7. If the letters D and G were removed from the alphabet, which 
would be the sixth letter of those remaining? ( ) 
8. Write the letter which comes midway between E and K in the 
alphabet? ( ) 
9. If the alphabet had only twenty -four letters, E and H being 
left out, which would then be the tenth letter? ( ) 
10. Which letter is as many letters before V in the alphabet as 
E is before G? ( ) 
11. Write the letter which is next to L, but not next to N in 
the alphabet? ( ) 
12. If the letters of the word DISPLAY were arranged in alphabetical 
order, which would then be the middle letter? 
13. Write that letter which comes between the twelfth and 
fourteenth letters of the alphabet. 
34. Which two letters in the word 17VIATIGN come after P in the 
alphabet? 
15. Write the letter which comes midway between A end I in the 
alphabet? 
16. If the letter 0 were removed from the alphabet, which letter 
would then be midway between L and S? 
17. Which letter in the word OVERWHELM occurs latest in the 
alphabet? 
) 
18. If the first thirteen letters of the alphabet were placed in 
order directly above the last thirteen, which letter would 
be directly below D? ( ) 
19. If the letters of the word GROUPED were rearranged so as to be 
in alphabetical order, which letter would then be in the 
middle? 
20. One day of the week begins with the letter which comes just 
before N in the alphabet. Write the third letter of 
this day. 
21. If the letters of the word REMOVAL were rearranged so as to 
be in alphabetical order, which would then be the middle 
letter? ( ) 
22. Write the letter which comes midway between B and H in the 
alphabet. ( ) 
23. Which letters in the word IMPULSE come after R in the alphabet ?( ) 
24. If all the letters of the word GIBE were removed from the 
alphabet, which would be the sixth letter of those 
remaining? ( ) 
iv 
Test II. (Elimination). 
Read this: - 
Five men, whom we shall call A, B, C, D and E, each inhabit one 
floor of a five- storied house. 
B lives two floors above A and one floor below D. 
E lives one floor below A. 
Now write in the brackets the answers to the following questions: - 
1. Who lives on the bottom floor? . 
2. Who lives on the top floor? 
3. Who lives one floor up? 
Read this: - 
Betty, Jane, Tom, Peter and George sit round a circular table. 
Betty sits on Tom's right. 
George sits between Betty and Jane. 
Peter sits between Tom and Jane. 
Now underline in the brackets the correct answer to each of the following 
questions. 
4. Who sits between Peter and Betty? (Betty / Jane / Tom / Peter / George) 
5. Who sits between Tom and George? (Betty / Jane / Tom / Peter / George) 
6. Who sits between Peter and George? (Betty / Jane / Tom/ Peter / George) 
V 
Read this:- 
There are four boys, A, B, C and D who like tea and coffee. 
A takes both sugar and milk; B takes milk but no sugar. 
C takes neither sugar nor milk; D lakes sugar but no milk. 
A and D have coffee for breakfast; B and C have tea. 
A önd B have coffee at tea -time; C and D have tea. 
Now write in the brackets the answer to each of the following questions. 
7. Which boy has tea without sugar and milk at breakfast? 
8. Which boy drinks tea both at breakfast and at tea -time? 
9. Which boy does not drink tea at either meal? 
Read this:- 
Five men, whom we shall call A, B, C, D and E, live in five different 
towns. These towns, not in order, are London, Birmingham, Manchester, 
Newcastle and Edinburgh. 
A does not live in either London, Birmingham or Newcastle. 
E lives in Manchester. 
B does not live in either Newcastle or Birmingham. 
C has never been to Newcastle. 
Now underline in the brackets the correct answer to each of the following 
questions. 
10. Where does A live? (London / Birmingham / Manchester / Newcastle / Edinburgh) 
11. Where does B live? (London / Birmingham / Manchester / Newcastle / Edinburgh) 
12. Where does D live? (London / Birmingham / Manchester / Newcastle / Edinburgh) 
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Read this: - 
A, B, C, D and E are five girls. 
A and E are tall; the others are short. 
C, D and E swim; the others do not swim. 
A and C play tennis but not golf; the others play golf. 
Now write the answer to each of the following questions in the brackets. 
13. Which of the tall girls plays tennis? . . . ( ) 
11+. Which of the short girls does not swim? . . ( ) 
15. Which TWO girls play golf and swim? . . . ( ) 
Read this:- 
There are five girls, whom we shall call A, B, C, D, and E. Each 
of them has one or more favourite colours. 
A likes yellow and pink. 
B likes blue and green. 
C likes yellow and blue. 
D likes red, blue and green. 
E likes pink. 
Each girl wears a frock of a colour she likes and no two girls wear 
the same colour. 
Now underline in the brackets the correct answer to each of the following 
questions. 
16. What colour is A's frock? . . (pink / yellow / blue / green / red) 
17. What colour is B's frock? . . (pink / yellow / blue / green / red) 
18. What colour is D's frock? . . (pink / yellow / blue / green / red) 
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Read this:- 
There are five men, whom we shall call A, B, C, D and E. 
A, B and C wear hats, the others go bareheaded. 
B and D carry umbrellas, the others do not. 
A and E wear spectacles, the others do not. 
Now write in the brackets the answers to the following questions : - 
19. Which man wears spectacles but goes bareheaded? 
20. Which man carries an umbrella, but does not wear a hat? 
21. Which man neither wears spectacles nor carries an umbrella? ( 
Read this:- 
) 
I have five friends who live in the village where I live, and wham 
we shall call A, B, C, D, and E. 
A dnd C are tall while the others are short. 
C and E have red hair, while the others have brown. 
B and C go to the city early every morning, and don't return till 
the evening; the others remain in the village all the time. 
I myself don't leave the village, but I often meet a friend in the 
street. 
Now write the answer to each of the following questions in the brackets. 
22. One evening I met a friend who was tall and had brown hair. 
Who was he? 
23. One evening I met a friend who had just come off a train. 
He was short and had brown hair. Who was he? 
24. One afternoon I met a friend who was short and had brown 
hair. Who was he? 
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Test III. (Analogies). 
Look at this example:- 
Hand is to Glove as Foot is to (clothes / boot / arm / body / finger). 
"Boot" is underlined because a boot covers a foot in the same way 
as a glove covers a hand. 
Here is another example:- 
Boy is to Man as Girl is to (infant / niece / brother / parent / woman). 
"Woman" is underlined because just as a boy grows into a man so does 
a girl grow into a woman. 
Now underline in the brackets the correct answer to each of 
the following:- 
1. Book is to Library as Food is to (bread / eat / drink / cook/ 
/larder / oven). 
2. Add is to Plus as Subtract is to (divide /minus / arithmetic/ 
/multiply / sum / equal). 
3. Hand is to Palm as Foot is to (leg / ankle / toe / sole / 
/ arm / heel). 
If. Fire is to Heat as Lamp is to (flame / candle / see / light/ 
/ soot / dark). 
5. Bow is to Arrow as Rifle is to (shoot / trigger / bullet/ 
/ barrel / archer / target). 
6. House is to Chimney as Ship is to (engine / coal / funnel / sea/ 
/ cabin / smoke). 
7. Castle is to Tower as Church is to (cathedral / priest /pulpit/ 
/ roof / spire / pillar). 





9. House is to Window as Ship is to (cabin / funnel / porthole / sea/ / deck / captain). 
10. Birth is to Beginning as Death 
is to (funeral / age / bury / life / / illness / end). 
11. Gas is to Gasometer as Water is to (pipe / reservoir / steam / air/ / kettle / stove). 
12. Shilling is to Pound as 
Hundredweight is to (stone / ton / penny / weigh/ 
/ounce / hundred). 
13. See is to Blind as Hear is to (noise / ear / silent / dumb/ / smell / deaf). 
14. Electricity is to Switch as 
Water is to (pipe / steam / tap / kettle/ / gas / fire) . 
15. Weep is to Sorrow as Laugh is to (smile / clown / joy / frown / 
/cry / surprise). 
16. Good is to Better as Bad is to (evil / worse / best / less/ 
/worst / improve). 
17. Bird is to Feathers as Cat is to (mouse / claws / tail / milk/ 
/paws / fur) . 
18. Shilling is to Penny as Foot is to (inch / yard / pound / mile/ / furlong / acre). 
19. Pound is to Four Shillings 
as Half -crown is to (sixpence / shilling / penny/ 
/florin / five shillings / ten shillings) . 
20. Hill is to Mountain as Wood is to (tree / meadow / thicket / forest/ 
/river / valley). 
21. Yes is to Allow as No is to (not / ask / please / perhaps/ 
/forbid / none) . 
22. Ankle is to Toe as Wrist is to (arm / foot / elbow / knuckle/ / leg / finger) . 
23. Vinegar is to Sour as Honey is to (sugar / comb / bee / sticky / / sweet / yellow). 
24. Long is to Short as Stretch is to ( elastic / pull / small / / expand / tight / compress). 
Test IV. (Classification (Excl.)) . 
In each of the following questions there are TWO things which are 
like each other in some way but are different from the others in the 
question. You have to find these two and underline them. 
Here is an example:- 
Tree / ocean / blue / cloud / green. 
"Blue" and "green" are both colours, and so we have underlined 
Now do these. Find the TWO that are most like each other, but 
















James / Joan / John / Anne / George. 
Laugh / weep / talk / sing / speak. 
Summer / January / Monday / Christmas / August. 
Foot / pound / minute / inch / gallon. 
,Iron / glass / wood. / ink / wool / cork. 
Apple / potato / pear / chestnut / barley. 
. Letter / stamp / postman / postcard / address. 
1 + / III / X / V / 7 / I I . 
Brave / good / heroic / cowardly / bad. 
Chin / forehead / neck / beard / nose / moustache. 
Lake / forest / mountain / road / field. / hill. 
. Wheat / meat / carrots / barley / fruit. 
. Desk / pupil / teacher / student / blackboard. 
. . 22/4,0/55/70/10 /30. 
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15. . . . House / roof / cottage / garden / brick. 
16. King / general / doctor / bishop / lawyer / major. 
17. . Tie / hat / coat / socks / cap / collar. 
18. . Sentence / comma / noun / grammar / verb. 
19. . Sing / paint / dance / read / work / draw. 
20. . . . Undecided / have / choose / wish for / pick out. 
21. . . . Sarah / Bill / Margaret / Anne / Arthur. 
22. . Betty / George / Margaret / John / Helen. 
23. . . . Money / penny / stamp / bank / sixpence / purse. 
24. . Comb / toothpaste / mirror / hairbrush / towel. 
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Test V. ( Alyphabet Series) 
Look at these letters: - 
D, F, H, 
F is the second letter in the alphabet after D, and H is the second 
letter after F. In the first blank space, therefore, we must write 
B, and in the second blank space we must write J. Thus:- 
B 
D, F, H, 
In the same way, in each of the next questions there is a rule 
which tells how one letter or group of letters is found from those 
coming before or after it. Find out what this rule is, and then 
write in each of the two blank spaces what should go there. Remember 
you have to fill in TWO blank spaces in each question. 
The alphabet is printed here to help you. 




In these questions you have to write ONE letter in each blank space. 
. . H, K, P?, 
. . D, H, L, 
J, L, hT! P, 
In these questions you have to write TWO letters in each blank space. 
1+. LK, v JI, 1G, 
5. . . . , GH, HI, IJ, JK, 
6. 7N, Y2ú, 
In these questions write ON'E letter in each blank space. 
7. . . . A, D, G, , 
8. . . . H, G, F, , 




In these questions you have to write TJO letters in each blank space. 
LTvI, LN, LO, , 
ZY, YX, XW, , 
. , PCI , QR, RS, ST, 
In these questions write ONE letter in each blank space. 







H, IL, TT, 
In these questions write TJO letters in each blank space. 






In these questions write ORE letter in each blank space. 
19. 
20. 
H, I, J, 
I, 
21. N, L, J, H, 










Test VI. (Classification (naming)). 
Look at these words: - 
Pansy / violet / rose / flower / lilac 
Pansy, violet, rose and lilac are all flowers. "Flower" is thus 
the general word which describes the others, so we have underlined 
"flower" as the answer. 
In the same way underline the general word in each of the following 
questions. 
1. Mutton / beef / pork / lamb / veal / meat 
2. .. Sand / chalk / mineral / clay / coal / rock 
3. . Cottage / building / church / school / shop / museum 
4.. Bus / wagon / vehicle / tramcar / motor -car / dray 
5. Maize / wheat / oats / barley / rice / cereal 
6. . Major / captain / lieutenant / officer / colonel / 
/ brigacTi er, 
7. . Paraffin / coal / fuel / wood / coke / petrol 
8. . Pot / saucer / saucepan / utensil / rolling -pin / spoon 
9. Burrow / nest / home / cottage / lair / kennel 
10. . Sight / hearing / sense / smell / taste / touch 
11. Trumpeter / organist / musician / pianist / drummer / 
/ violinist 
12. . . Medicine / profession / law / engineering / teaching / 
/ science 
13. Water / milk / liquid / wine / lemonade / oil 
11+. Rake / saw / hammer / chisel / tool / hoe 
15. Instrument /thermometer / barometer / compass / 
/ microscope / telescope 
16. . . Fry / stew / bake / cook / grill / roast 
17. Palace / mansion / cottage / bungalow/ dwelling / villa 
18. Emotion / fear / anger / love / despair / hate 
19. . Tin / metal / steel / lead / aluminium / zinc 
20. Oats / wheat / rye / grain / rice / barley 
21. Bottle / box / bag / cask / container / pail 
22. Trunk / suit -case / mail -bag / luggage / 
/ packing -case / kit -bag 
23. . Fly / beetle / insect / ant / wasp / butterfly 
24. . . Wardrobe / table / arm -chair / settee / bed / 
/ furniture 
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Test VII. (Coding). 
Below are five words in a secret code. They mean 
WHILE, SMILE, WHALE, ALIVE, WHEAT 
but not in that order. By comparing them, especially their beginnings 
and endings you can find the meaning of each. Write the meanings in 
the brackets. 
1. Y J C N G ( 
2. U 0 KN G ( 
3 . C N K X G ( 
4 . Y J G C V ( 
5. Y J K NG ( ) 
Now here are five more words in the same code as before. They mean 
LEARN, DAILY, ANNOY, REACH, FUNNY 
but not in that order. By comparing them you can find the meaning of 
each. Write the meanings in the brackets. 
6. C P P Q A ( 
7. H WP P A 
8. T G C E J ( 
9. NG C T P ( 
10. F C K N A ( 
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Here are five words in a different code. They mean 
BROWN, CREAM, CLOWN, CHEER, CLEAN 
but not in that order. Compare them, and write the meanings in 
the brackets. 
11. A J C Y L 
12. Z P M U L 
13. AP C Y K 
14.. A J M U L 
15. AF C C P 
Here are five more words in the same code as the last five. They mean 
EVENT, EARTH, TARTS, PARTS, EMITS 
but not in that order. Compare them and write the meanings in the 
brackets. 
16. R Y P R Q 
17. C K GR Q 
18. C T C L R 
19. C Y P R F 
20. N Y P R Q 
Here are four words in a different code. They mean 
FANCY, FAIRY, MONEY, MARRY 
but not in that order. Compare them and write the meanings in the 
brackets. 
21. N L M V B 
22. U Z R I B 
23. N Z I I B 
24. U Z MX B 
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Test VIII. (Related Series). 
Underline the correct answers in the brackets to each of the 
following questions. 
1. If all large coins were worth more than smaller ones, which of 
the following coins would be worth most? 
(a halfpenny /a sixpence /a shilling/a fkrthing/a penny) 
2. If all fast -moving animals were smaller than slower- moving ones, 
which of the following would be largest? 
(tortoise /hare / sheep / mouse / hippopotamus) 
3. If all rough substances were darker in colour than all smoother 
ones, which of the following would be darkest? 
(writing -paper / blotting -paper / sandpaper /brown paper/ 
/tissue paper) 
4. If all big articles were worth more than smaller ones, which of 
the following would be worth least? 
(a watch / a hat / a flower -pot / an umbrella / a clock) 
5. If all small articles weighed more than larger ones,which of the 
following would be heaviest? 
(a pencil / a pin / a book / a table / a chair) 
6. If all dark -skinned animals moved more swiftly than lighter - 
skinned ones, which of the following would move most slowly'? 
(fox / panther / grizzly bear / polar bear /wolf) 
7. If all shiny substances were worth more than duller ones, which 
of the following would be least valuable? 
(rubber / coal / steel / diamond / silver) 
8. If all tall boys weighed more than all smaller ones, which of the 
following would weigh most? 
(Tom - 5 ft. 2 in. / Jack - 4 ft. 9 in. / Dick - 5 ft. 5 in./ 
/David -5 ft. /Jim -1r. ft. 7 in.) 
9. If all large animals were worth less than smaller ones, which of 
the following would be most valuable? 
(horse / cow / monkey / elephant / cat) 
30C 
10. If all small creatures could travel faster than larger ones, 
which of the following could travel fastest? 
(snail / greyhound / shark / eagle / fly) 
11. If all soft substances were rougher than all hard substances, 
which of the following would be smoothest? 
(wool / rubber / diamond /mud / glass) 
12. If all light substances were worth more than heavier ones, 
which of the following would be most valuable? 
(petrol / cork / air / water / cotton -wool) 
13. If all hard substances were hotter than softer substances, 
which of the following would be the hottest? 
(ice / steel / cotton -wool / wood / leather) 
14. If all big objects were softer than all sni I1 ones which of 
the following would be the hardest? 
(cannon -ball / tennis ball / golf ball / cricket ball/ 
/f ootball) 
15. If all slow - moving creatures were worth more than faster - moving 
ones, which of the following would be the most valuable? 
(worm / race -horse / sheep / dog / deer) 
16. If all heavy things were smaller than lighter ones, which of 
the following would be largest? 
(a pound of sugar /half a pound of tea / an ounce of butter/ 
/a stone of potatoes / two pounds of flour) 
17. If all fast-moving creatures were larger than slower -moving 
ones, which of the following would be largest? 
(cart -horse / greyhound / rhinoceros / rat / snail) 
18. If all hard substances weighed more than softer ones, which of 
the following would be the lightest? 
(aluminiuni / tin / clay / glass / wood) 
19. If all light substances were worth more than darker ones, which 
of the following would be least valuable? 
(diamond / copper / wood / coal / lead) 
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20. If all heavy articles were larger than lighter ones, which of 
the following would be the largest? 
(a milk -jug / a tray -cloth / a cup / an iron / a wooden spoon) 
21. If the highest marks in exams were always made by the least 
clever children, which of the following marks would be 
made by the most clever child? 
( 68/72/55/4+2/4+0 ) 
22. If all smooth substances were hotter than all rough substances, 
which of the following would be hottest? 
(stone / ice / earth [wood / coal) 
23. If all fast -moving vehicles were larger than slower - moving ones, 
which of the following would be smallest? 
(car / train / motor - bicycle / horse -drawn cart / lorry) 
2J. If all rough cloth were worth more than smooth cloth, which of 
the following would be the most valuable? 
(velvet / silk / sackcloth / wool / cotton) 
